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ABSTRACT
UNDERSTANDING INNOVATION AND IMITATION IN EVOLUTION
Karen Kovaka
Michael Weisberg
Biologists have a long history of arguing about the relative importance of organisms and
environments in driving evolution. Do organisms passively respond to their environments
or actively shape them? Is the environment just a filter that removes the least fit
organisms from each generation, or also a source of new traits? The most recent
incarnation of these debates focuses on developmental plasticity, a developing
organism's sensitivity to environmental inputs. All organisms are plastic to some degree.
Many can change their sex, morphology, and behavior in response to their environments.
The question for biologists is, does the widespread presence of developmental plasticity
mean new traits can originate in response to new environmental conditions, and prior to
genetic changes? According to one influential hypothesis, plasticity is a significant
source of novel traits in evolution. I make three arguments regarding this plasticity-first
hypothesis. First, that it has revisionary implications for how we understand what
biological inheritance is. Second, that confirming the hypothesis will require biologists to
shift their methodological priorities and make use of a richer set of resources, especially
formal modeling and experimental evolution. Third, that the ongoing debate about the
hypothesis is exemplar of a fascinating and misunderstood type of scientific controversy
called a relative frequency controversy. Some philosophers consider these controversies
a waste of time, but I provide an account on which they are an important and productive
component of scientific practice.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The branching tree is the central metaphor of evolutionary biology. Despite Darwin's
considerable experience as a naturalist, you will find in all 500 pages of the first of
edition of The Origin of Species only a single illustration: Darwin's rudimentary rendition
of the tree of life.
The tree image went on to become the standard bearer in battles over the
organization and conceptualization of life (Archibald 2014). In the 1800s, Darwin's tree
presented an alternative to the ancient picture of life as a ladder whose every rung was
occupied by species arranged in order of increasing complexity. It denied the hallowed
distinction between “higher” and “lower” organisms. It challenged the once-universal
view that the differences between living things are fixed, and it flouted the Linnaean
system of classification which arranged species on the basis of structural similarities. In
defiance of past dogmas, the tree represented the relationships between different kinds of
living things as familial.
The metaphor of the branching tree of is now so well ingrained in biology and the
broader culture that it has nearly become a cliché. But the lessons of the tree are as
important today as they were when Darwin drew his first sketch. At the base of the tree is
a universal common ancestor. Between this ancestor and every extant living creature run
unbroken lineages, millions of branches that extend back over 3.5 billion years. Within
these ancient lineages is a story of inheritance, a story of how life's differences and
similarities alike have grown from the same source. The same mechanisms that have
made a giant family of all living things are also responsible for life's rampant diversity.
1
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The discovery of this fact is evolutionary biology's great achievement. Explaining
how it can be true has been the science's mission for over one hundred and fifty years. In
Understanding Innovation and Imitation in Evolution, I explore the status of this quest in
contemporary biology. I examine ongoing debates about the nature of inheritance and
develop tools that improve our understanding of inheritance and its capacity for
producing both similarity and diversity. I also analyze the structure of these debates in
order to discover what makes them so persistent and, at times, intractable.
For many years following the debut of The Origin of Species, the greatest
weakness in Darwin's theory of evolution was his view of inheritance. If all living thing
are related, people asked, how can they also be so diverse? The tree of life has grown in
many different directions, and each change in direction has involved both the production
of novelty and the conservation of form. What is the secret behind this witches' brew of
innovation and imitation?
To feel the force of the problem, think of the simple fact that children look like
their parents. Darwin explained this fact by appealing to blending inheritance, the idea
that children's traits are mixtures of their parents' traits. Some version of this theory has
been intuitively compelling to humans for thousands of years. It led our ancestors to
establish successful animal domestication and selective breeding regimes, and it shows
up again and again in enduring works of literature, from the writings of Hippocrates to
Shakespeare (Mameli 2005).
But if the theory of blending inheritance is true, why aren't members of
interbreeding groups identical? Generation after generation of mixing should homogenize
a population, much like mixing different colors of paint ultimately produces a palette of
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muddy brown. This phenomenon is called regression to the mean, and it led many to
think Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection was unworkable. Evolution by
natural selection requires a population that varies, but Darwin's theory of inheritance
predicted homogeneity. Blending inheritance, if true, makes it impossible for all living
things to have a common ancestor.
The story of who untangled this mystery is, by now, familiar. During the same
years Darwin was developing his theory of natural selection, Gregor Mendel was also
hard at work, breeding lines of peas and discovering patterns and laws of inheritance
(Henig 2001). He hypothesized that hereditary material, the physical stuff that offspring
inherit from their parents, is made up of discrete units which combine in various ways to
produce distinct traits. Wrinkled and smooth peas. Red, white, and pink flowers. Though
it would be nearly a century before the biological community integrated the Mendelian
view of inheritance with the theory of evolution by natural selection, the discovery of
particulate hereditary material would solve Darwin's mystery. The tree of life branches
and branches, but it never breaks. This is possible because hereditary material has several
special features. Not only is hereditary material composed of particulate units, but
inheritance processes transmit it reliably, while still allowing for occasional variations
which manifest themselves as variations in the visible traits of organisms. It was the
scientist Wilhelm Johannsen who gave these units of heredity their name. In 1909, he
used the word “gene” to refer to hereditary material for the first time (Johannsen 1909).
As the field of genetics has developed, questions about the nature of inheritance
have receded to the background of biology. To be sure, studies of genetic inheritance
have proliferated. Evelyn Fox Keller is right to call the twentieth century the “century of
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the gene” (Keller 2002). But the tremendous advances in our understanding of genetics
have in many ways depended on being less curious about other kinds of inheritance. Until
recently, there was a pervasive sense among biologists that the mystery of inheritance
was a mystery no longer, and that further scientific advances would take as foundational,
but not reexamine, the received view of biological inheritance.
Today, many scientists no longer feel so confident that the mystery of inheritance
is resolved. Two primary lines of research are responsible for this shift. The first is the
growing field of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo, for short) which studies
the development of organisms develop from egg to maturity (reviewed in Gilbert and
Epel 2008). The key insight of evo-devo is that the relationship between an organisms's
genes and its visible traits is mediated by a host of developmental processes.
Development can affect whether an organism is male or female, weak or strong, smart or
stupid. This phenomenon, called developmental plasticity, makes development relevant to
understanding parent-offspring resemblances.
The second line of research is extended inheritance theory (reviewed in
Bonduriansky and Day 2009). Organisms inherit more than just DNA from their parents.
They inherit the non-genetic contents of germ cells. They inherit environmental
conditions, life-sustaining microbes, shelters such as nests and lodges, and a host of other
extra-genetic resources. In many species, imitation of parental behaviors is an important
channel for passing on behavioral traits. Scientists who study extended inheritance theory
aim to discover which of these mechanisms have evolutionary consequences and to
establish how important they have been in the history of life.
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Together, evo-devo and extended inheritance theory have reignited dormant
debates about the nature of inheritance and its role in evolutionary theory (reviewed in
Pigliucci and Müller 2010). The centrality of inheritance to evolution, combined with the
fierce and sometimes frustrating character of these debates, makes this a rich area for
philosophical investigation. Biologists disagree about the importance of genes relative to
developmental and extra-genetic processes, and while empirical evidence is relevant to
resolving these debates, there are important theoretical and conceptual disagreements that
benefit from philosophical analysis. The dynamics of the scientific debates themselves
are also fascinating, and approaching them from a philosophical perspective illuminates
what it means to successfully resolve controversy and reach scientific consensus.
In the following two chapters of this thesis, I address first-order questions about
inheritance theory. The final two chapters deal with methodological and epistemic
questions related to scientific disagreement. The only way to make progress on such
questions is to engage with the technical details of various scientific hypotheses and to
analyze the merits of subtle conceptual distinctions. Nonetheless, the mystery that
motivates this project is accessible and compelling: how does evolution produce its
witches' brew of innovation and imitation? These chapters develop a view of inheritance
that accommodates the latest empirical evidence and integrates different methodological
approaches to the topic. The result is a synthetic account that highlights important links
between superficially disparate inheritance mechanisms. I also propose a novel account
of how scientists resolve intractable disputes and show that a maligned class of scientific
controversy has unacknowledged value.
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Chapter 2 provides a brief introduction to extended inheritance theory. I survey
the landscape of existing accounts of inheritance, outline what I think the goals of a
philosophical account of inheritance are, and highlight important questions that the
existing literature leaves unanswered.
Chapter 3 introduces a theoretical tool for better understanding inheritance. I
argue that the phenomenon of developmental plasticity should lead us to abandon the
common view that the most important extra-genetic inheritance mechanisms are the ones
that are most similar to DNA transmission. This view is wrong because developmental
plasticity allows for two kinds of inheritance mechanisms: replicators, which pass on
adapted developmental resources, such as genes and epigenetic marks, and inducers,
which pass on non-adapted resources, such as habitats. These two kinds of inheritance
play different evolutionary roles, and biologists have ignored a potentially important class
of evolutionary process by focusing so much on the paradigm case.
Chapter 4 considers a specific debate about the role of developmental plasticity
in generating new traits. Debate about this plasticity-first hypothesis has been a source of
controversy among biologists for several decades. Despite plenty of new data, the main
points of disagreement in the debate have hardly shifted. I show that the debate suffers
from an underdetermination problem, that is, the present state of the evidence is not
sufficient to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. This problem arises because of the
tremendous difficulties associated with uncovering evidence about the details of ancient
evolutionary processes. I argue that at present, biologists are looking for the wrong kind
of evidence, and I offer a way to break this longstanding impasse. To uncover evidence
that can resolve the debate, biologists need to make use of a richer set of methodological
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resources, especially formal modeling and experimental evolution. The strategy I propose
is also a promising one for resolving stubborn underdetermination problems in other
areas of science.
Chapter 5 examines the debates about inheritance and development as exemplars
of a fascinating and misunderstood species of scientific controversy called a relative
frequency controversy. These are fights about how often certain phenomena occur, rather
than fights about whether or how they occur. Many philosophers and scientists are
skeptical about the value of these controversies. They think precise estimates of the
relative frequency of genetic versus extra-genetic inheritance are not scientifically
interesting. I respond to their skepticism by offering an account of relative frequency
controversies on which they are valuable and productive components of scientific
practice. I distinguish between explanatory, epistemic, and practical value and show that
relative frequency controversies are valuable along all three dimensions.

Chapter 2: Extended Inheritance Theory
1. Introduction
Debates about inheritance define the history of evolutionary biology. The greatest
weakness of Darwin’s original theory of natural selection was its inability to explain how
traits were transferred from parent to offspring. Fierce debates about the relationship
between Darwinism and Gregor Mendel's work on inherited traits continued well into the
twentieth century. The resolution of these debates in the 1930s and 1940s led to the
definitive statement of evolutionary theory now known as the Modern Synthesis. One of
the core commitments of the Modern Synthesis was the centrality of genetics to various
domains of biology (Mayr and Provine 1998). The resulting “genomic revolution”—a
prolonged investigation into the molecular structure of DNA—has dominated biology
since the late 1950s.
But now, half a century after the Modern Synthesis, inheritance is at the heart of
another controversy. DNA, it turns out, does not tell the whole story. As we now know,
parents pass a wide variety of extra-genetic resources on to their offspring, including
germ cells, their environment, and even their own behaviors. For the past twenty years,
some researchers have argued that these forms of “extended” inheritance must be
integrated into the Modern Synthesis.
These arguments have led to a minor consensus: biologists and philosophers agree
that any theory of biological inheritance must recognize that offspring inherit some extragenetic resources from their parents. They agree, in other words, that not all inheritance
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is genetic. But the consensus ends there. There are over a dozen different accounts of
inheritance in the literature, but disagreement persists about the following questions:
1. Did the original Modern Synthesis allow for extra-genetic inheritance, or must it
now be amended or extended to accommodate the emerging consensus?
2. What criteria must a process meet to be considered an inheritance mechanism?
3. Which proposed mechanisms of inheritance (epigenetic, ecological, behavioral,
cultural, etc.) meet the criteria, whatever they turn out to be?
4. Compared to genetic inheritance, how evolutionarily frequent and significant are
the extra-genetic mechanisms?
5. Does one conception of inheritance suffice for all of biology, or, is a plurality of
concepts needed, as is the case for the concepts of “gene” and “biological
individual”?
These questions, of course, generate further ones. Have the tenets of the Modern
Synthesis shifted over time? How good is the evidence supporting claims about the
evolutionary frequency and significance of various proposed inheritance mechanisms?
What is evolutionary significance, anyway? What role(s) does the concept of inheritance
play in biological and evolutionary theory? The list goes on. There are persuasive
answers for some of these questions. Others are barely addressed in the literature.
One of the most surprising facts about the inheritance debate as it exists today is
that while there are many proposals about the best way to understand extended
inheritance, the primary points of agreement and disagreement among the various
proposals are not at all clear. This makes it difficult to understand what is really at stake
in this debate. Are authors disagreeing over terminology, theory, methodology, evidence,
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or all of the above? Which views have the most in common, and which ones are truly
incompatible? Occasionally, advocates of different proposals explicitly disagree with one
another and try to spell out the reasons for their disagreement (e.g. the exchange in
Sterelny 2011a and Godfrey-Smith 2011), but these attempts are rare.
I survey the landscape of biological and philosophical proposals related to
extended inheritance. I have three aims. The first is to articulate how I understand the
goals of a philosophical account of inheritance. The second is to identify relevant
dimensions of comparison for different accounts of inheritance. The third is to show that
the literature on inheritance contains three different but complementary methodological
approaches. A fully satisfying account of inheritance will incorporate all three of these
approaches.
2. Goals of a philosophical account of inheritance
I understand the goals of a philosophical account of inheritance in terms of
Godfrey-Smith's (2014) discussion of two different roles for philosophy of science, an
integrative role and an incubator role. The integrative role is “aims at an overall picture
of what the world is like and how we fit into it” (p. 1). The tasks of integrating
knowledge from different sources and considering how insights from different disciplines
relate to each other are important. They are also tasks that are unlikely to get done unless
some people are charged with accomplishing them, given the degree of specialization that
most disciplinary-specific research requires.
The second role for philosophy is the incubator role. When philosophy performs
the incubator role, it “is a place where ideas are developed in speculative and broad
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form...that often make their way into an empirical form within some science”(p. 3). In
this role, philosophy grapples with questions that are not yet formulated in a way that
allows scientists to make good progress on them. Philosophy can (though by no means
does it always do this!) help make such questions fit for further scientific investigation
and testing.
The contrast between these two roles is that, “On the integrative side, philosophy
draws on the sciences. In its incubator role, it contributes to them” (p. 4). Both are
valuable, but the integrative role is more central to philosophy. Succeeding in the
incubator role enhances the value of a philosophical project, but such success is not
required for a project to have philosophical value in the first place.
In the context of inheritance, philosophy in its integrative role draws on the
diverse results of disciplines such as developmental biology, population and quantitative
genetics, molecular genetics, and ecology to answer questions such as the following:
How and why is inheritance important in evolution? What are the important features that
help us determine whether a given process is an inheritance mechanism or not? Which of
these mechanisms are the most important in evolution? What features make different
inheritance mechanisms more or less important? How do different inheritance
mechanisms interact with one another? These questions are empirical in an important
sense, but giving satisfying answers to them requires more than empirical work alone. It
also requires integrative thinking about the relationships between different empirical
facts, interpretations of data, and assessments of normative concepts like “evolutionary
significance.”
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Integrative philosophical work on inheritance will seek to answer questions like
the ones above. It will also look for connections between the different scientific
approaches to inheritance and ask about the virtues and drawbacks of these difference
approaches, both for pursuing scientific questions and for generating a broad
understanding of the phenomenon of inheritance.

Integrative philosophical work on

inheritance may or may not end up contributing to biology by raising new questions for
researchers to pursue or revealing hidden assumptions that forestall progress. One may
hope that it will, and one may even look for ways in which integrative philosophical work
can also play this incubator role. In fact, in the next chapter I argue that the ideas about
inheritance I develop help to make difficult scientific problems more tractable. But
making a measurable contribution to how scientists conduct their work is not the primary
goal, nor is appropriate as a solo standard of evaluation.
The integrative question I address in this chapter is, how are the different views of
inheritance in the biological and philosophical literature related to one another? I clarify
points of complementarity and incompatibility in order to understand what is at stake in
the arguments among proponents of different views.
3. Dimensions of variation
In this section, I identify five dimensions along which the many views of
inheritance in the literature vary. They are: (1) the definition of inheritance, (2)
explanatory goals, (3) stringency, (4) the units of inheritance, and (5) methodology.
These dimensions of variation track interesting theoretical differences among the views
(summarized in Table 1). The benefit of this approach to organizing and classifying
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different views of inheritance is that it makes clear which theoretical differences are
complementary and which are incompatible.
3.1 Definition of inheritance
It may seem odd that not even this basic question is settled. After all, without
some agreement about what inheritance is, participants in the inheritance debate may not
even be giving accounts of the same thing, in which case they aren't disagreeing so much
as talking past one another. But in fact, while everyone agrees that inheritance is
something like “what makes offspring resemble their parents,” their ways of making this
rough characterization more precise are quite divergent. Consider the following
examples:
For some authors, any developmental resources or factors that are transmitted
across generations are inherited, regardless of the effects these resources have on
offspring phenotypes (Odling-Smee et al 2003). If, for example, a parent raises its
offspring on a diet similar to its own, it has transmitted a developmental resource across
one generation. But the offspring may react differently to the diet than their parent did. If
so, the transmitted resource will not produce parent-offspring similarity, yet it will count
as inherited on these views.
More commonly, authors restrict inheritance mechanisms to those mechanisms
that produce similarities between parents and offspring (Griffiths and Gray 2001). These
accounts are still quite inclusive. They count many elements of an organism's
developmental environment as inherited, including many parental behaviors, diets,
habitats, and symbiotic bacteria. A related view, held by Griesemer (2000) and Merlin
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(forthcoming) accepts the similarity criterion, but adds another one to it: material overlap
of parent and offspring. These authors want to separate inter-generational causal
influences, which they do not consider inheritance, from inter-generational transmission,
which they do consider inheritance. An example of the former is a parent causing its
offspring to resemble it by raising the offspring in a habitat like the one the parent
experienced as a juvenile. An example of the latter is the transmission of certain
epigenetic states, such as DNA methylation markers, in the course of reproduction. Only
similarities that are produced by material overlap of parent and offspring are inheritance.
Another group of accounts narrows the definition of inheritance still further. For
them, inheritance is not simply the transmission of similarity, it is the transmission of
variation. These accounts emphasize the importance of heritable variation for evolution.
It is not enough that organisms tend to resemble their parents. They must resemble their
parents more than they resemble other members of the population. For example, all
parents on the planet transmit the effects of the force of gravity to their children, and
exposure to gravitational force affects the development of every living organism. But,
precisely because gravitational force is uniform across every population, it never
produces differences in traits on which natural selection can act. Gravity's failure to
transmit variation makes it evolutionarily inert, so many theorists (Danchin et al. 2011;
Jablonka and Lamb 2005) do not include it in their accounts of inheritance.
Many authors accept some variant of the view that inheritance is the transmission
of variation across generations. Yet there are important differences even among those
who agree on that basic characterization. Some claim that inheritance mechanisms do not
merely transmit variation, they also generate it (Sterelny 2001). Others limit inheritance
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to mechanisms for transmitting variation that are also adapted for that very purpose (Shea
2011).
A final issue is the stability of inheritance mechanisms. Over how many
generations must a mechanism transmit a resource in order to count as inheritance? For
some, a single generation is sufficient (Odling-Smee et al. 2003), while for others the
potential for transmission over indefinite generations is important (Sterelny 2001; Shea
2011).
3.2 Explanatory goals
Part of the reason that definitions of inheritance diverge so much is that authors
deploy them for different purposes. That is, they have different explanatory goals. The
most important distinction between different authors' explanatory goals is between those
who care more about understanding development (Griesemer 2000; Griffiths and Gray
2001) and those who care more about understanding evolution (Shea 2011; Sterelny
2001). Some also have the stated goal of using a single account of inheritance to help
unify evolutionary and developmental biology (Danchin et al. 2011).
Those who are interested in evolutionary questions tend to highlight particular
classes of evolutionary outcomes that they are interested in explaining. Sterelny, for
example, wants an inheritance concept that can explain the evolution of complex
adaptations. Jablonka is more interested in facilitated variation, evolutionary novelties,
and the maintenance of variation within a population. Those who are interested in
developmental questions are less likely designate particular types of outcomes as the
most interesting ones.
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With some exceptions (e.g. Merlin forthcoming), authors with an interest in
development use definitions of inheritance that focus on the transmission of similarities
while authors interested in evolution use definitions that focus on the transmission of
variation. This is because, as I noted in Section 3.1, the transmission of variation is
important for evolution in a way that it is not for development.
3.3 Stringency
The third dimension of variation among the accounts of inheritance that I am
considering is their stringency. Some views are permissive: willing to grant that many
types of mechanisms and particular token mechanisms count as inheritance mechanisms
(Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Griffiths and Gray 2001; Laland and Odling-Smee 2003,
2011). Others are restrictive, and limit the kind and number of inheritance mechanisms to
DNA transmission and only a very few extra-genetic ones (Shea 2011; Merlin
forthcoming). Finally, there are views of intermediate stringency (Sterelny 2001, 2004).
Some of these differences in stringency flow very naturally from the differences
in definitions and explanatory goals discussed above. All mechanisms that transmit
variation also transmit similarity, but not vice versa. We thus expect greater stringency
from the views whose explanatory goals are a particular class of evolutionary outcomes.
Yet this does not account for all differences in stringency. Another contributor to these
differences is whether authors want to capture all the mechanisms that could produce the
kinds of outcomes they are interested in (Jablonka 2005; Godfrey-Smith 2000, 2009), or
if they want to limit themselves to the mechanisms which have actually produced these
outcomes over the course of evolutionary history (Sterelny 2011).
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3.4 Units
The question of the units of inheritance is itself multi-faceted. One version of the
question is practical: what kinds of units should we track and measure when we do
empirical studies of inheritance? For some theorists, the kinds of entities that inheritance
mechanisms transmit across generations, whether genetic or non-genetic, are all
replicators (adapted objects that copy themselves). If this is right, the replicator category
provides a common currency for tracking and analyzing inheritance, no matter how many
diverse mechanisms of transmission there are.
This replicator view is quite controversial, however. One alternative to it is the
idea that instead of focusing on the entities that are transmitted by inheritance
mechanisms, it is better to focus on the traits that are affected by inheritance. This
proposal, from Jablonka (2004), suggests that the most importance unit of inheritance is
the heritably varying trait. Jablonka's proposal has much in common with recent
mathematical treatments of inheritance that abstract away from both the details of both
mechanisms and transmitted entities in order to assess their effects. Against such views,
Merlin (forthcoming) argues in favor of viewing inheritance as a cause rather than as an
effect.
Another facet of the units question has to do with how we should individuate
inheritance systems. Since the demise of the view that genetic transmission represents the
only pathway across generations, most authors have opted for a multi-channel view
(Lamm 2014), on which different kinds of information or phenotypic effects are
transmitted across generations by distinct inheritance channels. These multi-channelers

18

differ in the number and type of channels they recognize, but they agree on the general
strategy of conceptualizing inheritance as separable into such channels.
A notable exception to the multi-channel view are the few inheritance holists
(Griffiths and Gray 2001). These authors see the effects of inherited resources as so
entangled with one another that they think separating them into different channels is
hopeless and misleading. In order to emphasize the interconnectedness of inherited
developmental resources, they claim that the appropriate unit for thinking about
inheritance is the entire package of developmental resources that one generation passes to
the next.

3.5 Methodology
The final dimension of variation concerns methodology. Philosophers and
biologists use different strategies to develop their accounts of inheritance, and these
strategies fall into three categories: mechanistic (e.g. Jablonka and Lamb 2005; OdlingSmee 2007), statistical (e.g. Kerr and Godfrey-Smith 2009; Helanterä and Uller 2013) ,
and role-based (e.g. Sterelny et al. 1996; Shea 2007, 2011) approaches. Mechanistic
approaches focus on identifying particular extra-genetic inheritance mechanisms such as
behavioral transmission mechanisms and the cross-generational transmission of
epigenetic marks. They also propose ways of categorizing these mechanisms. The
proposed categorizations are based on similarities between the ways different
mechanisms operate, rather than on similarities between the kinds of outcomes the
mechanisms produce.
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Statistical approaches ignore mechanistic details and focus instead on
representing the contributions of both genetic and non-genetic inheritance to evolutionary
change, typically with a mathematical formalization called the Price Equation. The
flexibility of the Price Equation allows for many different statistical partitions. For
example, it allows for a multi-level partition of inheritance that separates transmission
between individuals and transmission between groups. It also allows for the classification
of inheritance mechanisms into groups according to differences in their short term
evolutionary effects (Helanterä and Uller 2010).
Finally, role-based approaches are similar to statistical approaches in that they
classify different types of inheritance not according to mechanism, but according to their
consequences. But they differ in that they want to identify the causal and mechanistic
features of inheritance mechanisms in virtue of which they have evolutionary
consequences. Once they have identified these features, role-based approaches use them
as criteria for determining what does and does not count as an inheritance mechanism.
These three approaches can certainly be complementary. In fact, I argue in
Section 4 that a complete account of inheritance should have mechanistic, statistical, and
role-based elements. In reality, however, role-based approaches tend to be more stringent
than mechanistic or statistical ones, a fact which appears to reflect affinities between
certain explanatory goals and methodologies.
Table 1 (following page) classifies nine different views of inheritance along the
dimensions I have described.
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Name

Proponents

Definition

1. Ecological Laland and
Inheritance Odling-Smee
View
2003, 2011;

transmission
of resources,
selection
Odling-Smee pressures
2007

Explanatory Goal Stringency Methodology

Units

connections
hyperbetween ecological, permissive
evolutionary,
developmental
phenomena

mechanistic

multichannel:
genetic
and
ecological

2. Four
Jablonka and
Dimensional Lamb 2005
Inheritance
View

transmission
of variation

evolutionary
permissive
phenomena; esp.
novelties and and
facilitated variation

mechanistic

multichannel;
heritably
varying
traits

3.
Darwinian
Populations
View

transmission
of similarity

evolutionary
phenomena;
possible causes

permissive

statistical

multichannel

4.
Griesemer
Reproducer 2000
View

reproduction
with material
overlap of
evolved
mechanisms
of
development

developmental
phenomena, and
connections to
evolution

restrictive

role-based

multichannel
with
material
overlap

5. Limited Merlin,
Extended forthcoming
Inheritance
View

transmission
of variation

evolutionary
phenomena; esp.
cumulative
selection

restrictive

role-based

multichannel
with
material
overlap

6.
Griffiths and
Developmen Gray 2001
tal Systems
View

recurring
developmental
developmenta phenomena, and
l resources
connections to
evolution

permissive

role-based

holist

transmission
and
generation of
variation

evolutionary
phenomena;
complex
adaptations

intermediat role-based
e

multichannel;
replicators

8. Inherited Shea 2007,
transmission
Representat 2011; English of variation
ions View et al. 2015

evolutionary
phenomena;
cumulative
selection

restrictive

role-based

multichannel;
adapted
channels

evolutionary
phenomena;
possible causes

permissive

statistical

multichannel

7.
Replicator
View

9. Price
Equation
View

GodfreySmith 2009;
Kerr and
GodfreySmith 2009

Sterelny
2001, 2004,
2011

Helanterä and transmission
Uller 2010;
of similarity
Bonduriansky
and Day 2011

Table 1. Classification of views of inheritance.
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4. Theoretical complementarity and incompatibility
What do we learn from such a sprawling comparison of different views? For the
purposes of this chapter, I will focus on just two points. First, there are two importantly
different clusters of views. Second, given a particular explanatory goal, we should try for
a synthetic view that incorporates all three methodological approaches.
One cluster of views emerges that overlaps in explanatory goals, methodology,
and permissiveness. The Four Dimensional Inheritance view (#2), the Darwinian
Populations View (#3), the Price Equation View (#9) are all permissive, multi-channel
views interested in explaining actual evolutionary phenomena, and in understanding
which mechanisms of inheritance have the potential to produce evolutionary outcomes.
Proponents of these views are also interested in developmental phenomena, but
understanding evolution is primary. They are not seeking to identify inheritance
mechanisms that always, consistently, produce interesting and important effects. Rather,
they want to identify mechanisms that can produce such outcomes, even if they do so
rarely. This set of views includes both mechanistic and statistical methodologies, but in
the context of so much common ground, it is clear that these different methodological
approaches are complementary rather than competitive.
Another cluster of views are the role-based views: the Reproducer View (#4), the
Limited Extended Inheritance View (#5), the Replicator View (#7), and the Inherited
Representations View (#8). Unlike the first cluster, these views are all of restrictive or
intermediate stringency, and, with the exception of the Reproducer View, their
explanatory goals also overlap. The proponents of these views are interested in
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explaining a particular set of evolutionary phenomena, one that is much narrower than the
first cluster of views. The type of evolutionary outcome that these views are interested in
is cumulative selection leading to adaptation, particularly complex, multi-part adaptations
like the vertebrate eye.
To the extent that these two clusters of views have valuable and distinct
explanatory goals, there is no reason to worry about the incompatibilities between them,
such as different definitions of inheritance, different conceptions of the units of
inheritance, and different levels of stringency. It is only when projects share an
explanatory target and are thus competing with one another that such differences need to
be resolved. At the same time, there are substantive questions about the value of different
explanatory goals and about the interrelations among different explanatory goals.
In this case, both clusters of views want to explain evolutionary phenomena, but
they are interested in different kinds of phenomena. If both views are right, then there is a
narrow set of inheritance mechanisms that is relevant to explaining cumulative selection
and complex adaptations, and a broader set of mechanisms relevant to explaining
phenomena such as the maintenance of variation and the emergence of novel traits. In the
next chapter, I will challenge this idea by showing that the narrower set of mechanisms is
not actually sufficient to explain the kinds of phenomena that the second cluster of views
is interested in.
Leaving that aside for now, what are we to make of the fact that the mechanistic
and statistical views are allied, and that they are not well-integrated with the role-based
views? I propose that this state of affairs is not ideal. Whatever our explanatory goal is,
the best explanation of our target phenomena will make use of all three methodologies.
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The reason is simple: all three methodologies tell us something interesting and different
about inheritance. Mechanistic approaches help us to identify actual inheritance
mechanisms in the world and to see interesting differences in how they function.
Statistical approaches allow us to understand how mechanisms that may operate
differently from one another or have a different physical bases can produce similar types
of evolutionary outcomes. Finally, role-based approaches highlight the features of
particular mechanisms that are most relevant to producing different evolutionary
outcomes.
The following passage from Shea et al. (2011) highlights one way in which rolebased approaches can supplement mechanistic ones:
Jablonka & Lamb (1995, 2005) deliberately employ a mechanistic
classification scheme in order to highlight the wide variety of nongenetic
effects on the phenotypes of future generations. In their usage, all
transgenerational epigenetic mechanisms are systems of inheritance.
Similarly, Bonduriansky & Day (2009) call all nongenetic
transgenerational effects between parents and offspring inheritance.
Although, this is a legitimate use of the world in its broad sense of 'things
received from a predecessor', only a subset of epigenetic mechanisms
forms a system of long-run inheritance in the way the genome is an
inheritance system. Focusing on the type of mechanism involved may
obscure such questions about the evolutionary significance of such
mechanisms (p. 1178).
While I agree with Shea et al. that there are virtues of their role-based approach that the
mechanistic approach does not have, I disagree with their implicit claim that the
difference in methodology is dictated by a difference in explanatory goals (the goals of
highlighting nongenetic transgenerational effects and the goal of identifying systems of
long-run inheritance). The fact that Jablonka & Lamb have different explanatory goals
than Shea et al. does not mean incorporating a mechanistic element would not improve
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Shea's view, nor that incorporating a role-based element would not improve Jablonka &
Lamb's view. In fact, the opposite is true. A mechanistic approach would shed light on
the physical basis of the different kinds of evolutionary effects Shea et al. identify. And a
role-based approach would help us understand the kinds of features that are essential for
producing the nongenetic transgenerational effects that interest Jablonka & Lamb.

5. Conclusion

The landscape of biological and philosophical proposals related to extended
inheritance is complex. In this chapter I have described what a philosophical account of
inheritance should seek to accomplish and provided some dimensions of analysis for
thinking about the similarities and differences among different proposals. I have also
argued that a complete and satisfying account of inheritance, regardless of its explanatory
goals, will incorporate three different methodological approaches. In the next chapter, I
propose a way of adapting the stringent, role-based approach of Sterelny and Shea (“the
replicator view”) to supplement Godfrey-Smith, Jablonka, and Lamb’s permissive,
mechanistic-statistical approach (“the classical view”).
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Chapter 3: Replicators, Inducers, and Evolutionary Innovation

1. Introduction

Transitional fossils serve as stunning confirmations of evolutionary theory, but they also
present important occasions for its revision. Tiktaalik roseae, the 375 million year old
missing link between fish and limbed animals, was discovered by a team of
paleontologists in 2004 and provided an unprecedented glimpse into this remarkable
evolutionary transition that saw the emergence of lungs, limbs, and terrestrial locomotion
(the ability to walk, slither, etc.) (Daeschler et al. 2006). The discovery of fossils like
Tiktaalik has put biologists in a far better position to make inferences about the origins of
these evolutionary innovations (Shubin et al. 2006).
After examining a set of transitional fossils, one research group has proposed that
terrestrial locomotion owes its origins to developmental plasticity, or the sensitivity of
developing organisms to environmental conditions (Standen et al. 2014). These
researchers suggest that the physical innovations that allowed tetrapods to move on land
appeared first as developmentally plastic responses to the environment. Their work is an
application of the more general hypothesis that developmental plasticity underpins the
emergence of many evolutionary innovations (Pigliucci 2001; West-Eberhard 2003).
In this chapter, I examine the implications of this general plasticity hypothesis for
way we understand inheritance in evolution. I develop and defend the idea that there are
two broad types of inheritance processes, those that transmit adapted developmental
resources, and those that transmit non-adapted developmental resources. Philosophers
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and biologists already have a name for adapted developmental resources. They are called
replicators. I show that non-adapted resources, which I call inducers1, produce distinctive
evolutionary effects and that these effects justify a conceptual distinction between
replicators and inducers. The literature on biological inheritance does not make this
distinction (at least not explicitly), but it should, because the distinction tracks interesting
evolutionary consequences.
This distinction also provides a way of synthesizing two competing views of
extended inheritance. The first, the replicator view, is committed to the claim that objects
called replicators (often but not always genes) are the only sources of evolutionarily
significant phenotypic variation. The second, the classical view, is quite heterodox, but its
proponents are united in their rejection of the claim that the replicator category is
fundamental to an analysis of inheritance. I show that the plasticity hypothesis challenges
both of these approaches. If the hypothesis is true, then replicators provide one source of
evolutionarily significant phenotypic variation, and there is value in retaining the
category in our theoretical articulation of inheritance. At the same time, environmental
conditions that induce plastic phenotypic responses provide another source of
evolutionarily significant phenotypic variation, and these inducers are likely critical for
the emergence of many evolutionary innovations,2 including the tetrapod limb. They too
belong in our theory of inheritance.

1 Following West-Eberhard's (2003) use of the term “environmental induction.”
2 In this chapter, I follow the literature on plasticity and innovation in defining evolutionary innovation
broadly: “ranging from the expression of traits or trait variants that are themselves novel to the
expression of existing traits in new behavioral, physiological, or morphological contexts” (Moczek et al.
2011, 1). Biologists are still divided on what, precisely, is required for something to count as a novelty
or an innovation (for a review of the issue, see Wagner and Lynch, 2010), but my argument does not
depend on any particular account of evolutionary innovation. Traits such as the tetrapod limb will
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2. Inheritance debates
Biological inheritance is what causes offspring to resemble their parents more
than they resemble other members of the population.3 The mechanisms that produce such
differential resemblances are called inheritance mechanisms, and the developmental
resources (i.e. causal inputs to development) that produce these resemblances are called
hereditary material. For example, the mechanisms and developmental resources that
contribute to having brown eyes like your parents rather than blue eyes like your best
friend's parents are mechanisms and resources of inheritance because they produce
variation as well as similarity.4
It is well known that evolution by natural selection requires inheritance. Offspring
must resemble their parents more than they resemble other members of their population
in order for natural selection in one generation to affect phenotypic frequencies in the
next. As a result, understanding which mechanisms and resources generate heritable
variation and why it is that they do so is important for understanding evolution itself.
Biologists also believe that studying inheritance mechanisms and hereditary
material can help them understand evolvability (Lamm and Jablonka 2008). Evolvability,
as I will use the term, is the evolutionary potential of lineages, or “the dispositional
property of lineages to evolve complex adaptation” (Brown 2014, 2). It is a contentious
qualify as innovations on any reasonable conception(s).
3 I follow Mameli (2005) in distinguishing between the inheritance of similarity and the inheritance of
variation. In this chapter, my focus is on the latter.
4 Though not all authors use the term inheritance in the way that I use it in this chapter (see, for example,
Griesemer 2000), the definitions I have given capture how my primary interlocutors in the literature on
extended inheritance use the terms.

28

term, in part because it is so broad, but it is still possible to give a unified account of the
concept (Brown 2014).5 With some exceptions (which I will note), this broad conception
is also the one my interlocutors in the extended inheritance debate have in mind. When
they say an inheritance system is evolvable, they mean it has the potential to produce rich
evolutionary change (Sterelny 2011b, 84). When they seek to justify a conception of
inheritance, they appeal to the insights it provides about evolvability (Jablonka and Lamb
2005, 353). As we will see, the replicator and classical views emphasize different ways in
which inheritance systems promote evolvability. I will show that these differences in
emphasis are complementary and provide an account of biological inheritance that
accommodates both.
Like evolvability, biological inheritance is itself a controversial topic. Throughout
much of the twentieth century, most evolutionary theorists believed the genetic system
was the only inheritance mechanism and genetic material was the only hereditary
material (Futuyma 1997; Ridley 1996). Researchers have since discovered many counterexamples to these claims, leading to vigorous debates about (1) which alleged instances
are genuine cases of evolutionarily significant non-genetic inheritance and (2) how to
best expand the gene-centric model of inheritance to accommodate non-genetic
inheritance (for a review, see Bonduriansky and Day 2009).

5 Brown's conception of evolvability is inspired by Sterelny's (Brown 2014, p 2). On her account,
“evolvability is the objective probability of a particular feature or set of features, F, arising at some
future time, T, given the state of a population, X, and relevant features of its environment, B, at some
particular starting point” (p 15). This is consistent with the conception of evolvability that proponents of
the replicator and classical views use, provided we fill out the variables in the definition in the
appropriate way.
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2.1 The replicator view
The replicator view (also called the extended replicator view) is a popular solution
to the problem of non-genetic inheritance. The most prominent advocate is Sterelny
(2001; Sterelny et al. 1996), but the view is also attributable to Dawkins (1982), and Hull
(2001). A related view that focuses on the transmission of representational content has
also been developed by Shea (2007). According to the replicator view, there are many
inheritance channels, but replicators are the only type of hereditary material. Genes are
the paradigmatic replicators, but there are also non-genetic replicators, such as nests
(Sterelny et al. 1996, 398) and symbiotic microorganisms (Sterelny 2004, 499). Nongenetic replicators are transmitted through various non-genetic inheritance channels.
To qualify as a replicator, a developmental resource must meet two criteria. It
must (1) be copied and (2) have a developmental biofunction (that is, it must have been
selected to have the particular phenotypic effects that it has and thus influence its own
prospects of being copied (Sterelny 1996; 2011a)). When there is variation in replicators,
there is also phenotypic variation, so when different parents pass on different sets of
replicators to their children, there is inheritance of variation.6
Replicators: developmental resources that pass on their organization to
descendants through a copying process and influence their own prospects
of being copied (adapted from Sterelny 2011a, 491)

6 Variations in replicators do not always translate into phenotypic variation. Confounding causal
influences, including developmental processes and other replicators, can alter the relationship between a
replicator variant and the phenotypic variant it was selected to produce. Some authors argue this is a
substantial problem for the replicator view (see Jablonka 2004). A potential solution to this problem is
Shea's (2011, 65) suggestion that inheritance systems are developmental resources that have the metafunction of “transmitting phenotypes down the generations.”
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Proponents of the replicator view argue that it provides a way to incorporate nongenetic inheritance into evolutionary theory and is also uniquely suited to provide
insights into evolvability. They reason that high fidelity copying is a requirement (at least
historically) for the evolution of complex adaptations, a fact which the replicator view
captures but competing views (such Godfrey-Smith's (2009)) do not, because these
alternatives do not make reference to replicators at all (Sterelny 2011a, 495). Once we
have identified the central role that replicators play in evolution, we can specify
additional features of replicators that make them more or less evolvable. Copy fidelity is
one such feature, but authors have also highlighted the importance of non-biased
transmission and the generation of variation (see Sterelny 2001; Michod 1999; Szathmary
and Maynard Smith 1995).
Central to the replicator view is a concern with the transmission of hereditary
material. If the mechanism of intergenerational transmission is inaccurate or unstable,
then the transmitted resource will not produce reliable parent-offspring resemblances, and
is therefore not hereditary material. Sterelny and other advocates of the replicator view
argue that only replicators are transmitted with the accuracy and stability required to
produce parent-offspring resemblances strong enough to support complex adaptations.
They therefore do not accept the proposed cases of non-genetic inheritance in which
hereditary material is not composed of replicators because they doubt that the so-called
inheritance mechanisms are evolvable (see Shea 2011 (73-74) for a similar argument).
For example, in a discussion of whether environmental engineering is an inheritance
system, Sterelny writes:
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I argue that an inheritance system must have a particular suite of features
if life is to be evolvable. Genetic inheritance does have these features, but
much of what is lumped into ecological inheritance—thought not all—
does not. So although downstream environmental engineering is
important, for the most part it should not be treated as an inheritance
system (Sterelny 2001, 335).
On Sterelny's account, an evolvable inheritance system transmits a replicator set
from parent to offspring (339). Environmental engineering, such as when groups of trees
engineer their soil structures, does not have this feature, and so, “downstream
environmental engineering is not in general an inheritance system or cluster of
inheritance systems” (347). The replicator view, then, is committed to the claim that
hereditary material consists exclusively of replicators. I call this claim the replicator
commitment.
The replicator commitment: hereditary material consists exclusively of
replicators.7
This characterization of the replicator commitment as exclusive and
uncompromising is perhaps, at least in practice, overly strong. Many biologists and
philosophers surely hold the weaker view that replicators are the most common and
important, but not the only form of hereditary material. There are, however, three reasons
why a strong characterization of the replicator view is the appropriate focal point of this
chapter. First, it is the stated position of influential theorists. As Sterelny has it, “[T]he
Williams-Dawkins Conjecture is this: (1) richly evolvable selective regimes depend on
high fidelity inheritance; (2) all actual and feasible cases of high fidelity inheritance

7 The replicator commitment is not a claim about what is biologically necessary, but a contingent claim
about all of the inheritance systems that are known to us.
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depend directly or indirectly on replication” (2011a, 495).8 Second, practitioners appeal
to the strong version of the replicator commitment as a matter of course. Published
biological research is littered with claims that tacitly dismiss the possibility of nonreplicator hereditary material.9 Third, a significant motivation for defining replicators
broadly enough to include some non-genetic objects is to use the concept of replication to
determine which candidate instances of non-genetic inheritance are truly worthy of the
title. A weaker version of the replicator commitment on which hereditary material
consists mostly, but not exclusively, of replicators does not help us determine which
developmental resources are hereditary material and which are not.
2.2 The classical view
The replicator view has many critics. Jablonka and Lamb (2005) criticize it for
failing to individuate replicators satisfactorily (375) and for establishing a barrier
between replication and development that distorts our view of epigenetic and behavioral
inheritance systems (102, 189). Godfrey-Smith (2000, 413; 2009, 31-39; 2015, 1) has
argued that replicators are not necessary for evolution by natural selection, and that there
are cases in which the replicator view provides a poor description of the biological facts.
Griesemer et al. (2005) worry that the replicator view cannot offer insights into the
evolution of replicators. Proponents of niche construction theory (NCT) (Laland 2004)
and developmental systems theory (DST) (Griffiths and Gray 2001) have articulated
similar dissatisfactions with the replicator view.
8 See also Hull 2001, 57-58 for an endorsement of the replicator commitment.
9 For example, in Blount et al's 2012 paper on an experimentally induced evolutionary novelty we read
that, “A complete understanding of the evolution of a novel trait requires explanation of its ecological
function, its physiological basis, the underlying mutations and the history of the accumulated changes.”
See also Wagner and Lynch (2010).
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Though the details of these criticisms differ, they have a common structure. The
strategy is to call attention to specific examples in which the replicator view performs
badly, show that it is possible to conceive of inheritance without making reference to
replicators, and then abandon the replicator view altogether. There is a diverse set of
alternatives to the replicator view, but the common commitment is that any processes that
produce heritable variation may be inheritance systems, regardless of whether those
processes involve the transmission of replicators from parents to offspring. In this
respect, they all hearken back to the “classical” (Godfrey-Smith 2009) descriptions of
evolution by natural selection (see, for example, Lewontin 1970).
The classical commitment: any developmental resource that produces
heritable variation is hereditary material.
Of course, such an abstract characterization needs to be supplemented by an
explanation of what it is that disposes a developmental resource to produce heritable
variation. This is where the classical views diverge. Jablonka and Lamb (2005)
individuate inheritance systems mechanistically. Godfrey-Smith (2009) prefers the
statistical approach embodied by the Price Equation. DST (Griffiths and Gray 2001)
offers a holistic take on inheritance which declines to distinguish between inheritance
mechanisms except for pragmatic purposes. Mameli (2004) distinguishes between
genotypically and envirotypically produced variation and suggests a way of incorporating
the latter category into traditional population-genetic models.
Despite their differences, these accounts all emphasize the connection between
inheritance and the generation of variation. Jablonka and Lamb even define evolvability
as “ the capacity to generate heritable phenotypic variation” (Kirschner and Gerhart 1998,
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8420). While the replicator view privileges the transmission of variation over its
generation, classical views are much more explicitly interested in the ways in which nonreplicators produce truly novel evolutionary outcomes (Laland et al. 2015). Rather than
the power of cumulative selection, they are focused on identifying the sources of the
variation on which this selection acts, and on pointing out that the replicator view, carried
away by its enthusiasm for high-fidelity transmission mechanisms, fails to see these
sources of variation as hereditary material. Thus, classical views emphasize a different
aspect of evolvability than the replicator view does.
Unfortunately, classical views shift the emphasis from transmission to generation
without offering a satisfying response to the claim that a general account of inheritance
should explicitly acknowledge the connection between replicators and cumulative
selection. This is a significant oversight, because this is the feature that defenders of the
replicator view see as the chief advantage of their position. Stereleny and other
proponents of the replicator view agree with Jablonka and Godfrey-Smith and others that
it is possible to give a general account of inheritance that does not reference replicators,
but the reason they have sought to extend, rather than reject, the concept of replication is
that they believe that replicators have played a crucial role in the evolutionary history of
this planet, and that we compromise our ability to explain how lineages produce complex,
adaptive phenotypes unless we emphasize replicators.
Proponents of the classical view do not deny this claim, but they do not take it as
important enough to justify retaining the replicator category in their own accounts of
inheritance. Jablonka and Lamb, for example, allow that the genetic inheritance system is
an important form of inheritance, but they resist classifying genetic and non-genetic
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replicators together, as a type of hereditary material with a distinctive causal and
explanatory role. They write that “it is best to avoid this concept [of the extended
replicator] and concentrate on the way variation is constructed and transmitted through
developmental processes” (2005, 376).
In the remainder of this chapter, I argue that replicators do have a distinctive
causal and explanatory role, that there are disadvantages to abandoning the replicator
concept in our theoretical articulation of inheritance, and that retaining it does not
compromise the classical view's insight that there are many non-replicator sources of
heritable variation. My alternative offers an increase in explanatory power over both the
replicator and classical views. This is important, not only because explanatory power is a
consideration in choosing between accounts of inheritance, but also because rejecting the
replicator commitment is central to two emerging and influential perspectives in biology:
Eco-evo-devo (Gilbert et al. 2015, 616, 619) and the extended evolutionary synthesis
(EES) (Laland et al. 2015, 2). If rejecting the replicator commitment carries with it a loss
of explanatory power, then this is a problem for both Eco-evo-devo and EES. My
proposal can help these two perspectives respond to criticisms and open up new avenues
for research.
3. The challenge from plasticity
In this section, I describe the plasticity hypothesis for tetrapod evolution and draw
out two important implications of the hypothesis: (1) non-replicators can generate and
transmit phenotypic variation, but (2) the distinction between replicators and nonreplicators is still critical for making sense of the emergence and spread of the
evolutionary novelty. Thus, if the plasticity hypothesis is true, then the replicator
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commitment is false, because non-replicators perform the function of hereditary material.
Further, the replicator view's explanation of evolvable inheritance systems is incomplete.
Nonetheless, replicators do play a special role in inheritance, and to the extent that the
classical views gloss over this fact, their explanations of evolvable inheritance systems
are also incomplete.
3.1. The plasticity hypothesis
Standen et al.'s hypothesis about tetrapod evolution proposes the phenotypic
variation which laid the foundation for the evolution of limbs first appeared because
unusual environmental conditions induced new shapes in the pectoral bones of stem
tetrapods like Tiktaalik. A further process called genetic assimilation enhanced the
stability of these skeletal innovations so that they could contribute to continued evolution.
Earth's terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems changed fundamentally during the
Devonian Period (Algeo and Scheckler 1998). Evidence about the depositional
environments of transitional fossils suggests that stem tetrapods responded to
environmental changes by shifting habitats from deep waters to shallow floodplains and
oxbow lakes because they offered new food sources or safety from predators (Daeschler
et al. 2006; Retallack et al 2009). Standen et al.'s hypothesis is that these new habitats
also affected the development of pectoral fins and bones. “[T]he increased gravitational
and frictional forces experienced by terrestrialized fish...cause[d] changes in the
'effectiveness' of their locomotory behavior when travelling over land, as well as changes
in the shape of the skeletal structures used in locomotion” (Standen et al. 2014, 54). The
bones in stem tetrapods' pectoral girdles, which would eventually become shoulders in
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mammals, became narrower in some places and longer in others. These changes made
their movement over land more efficient. Parents exposed their offspring to the same
environmental conditions, so each new generation also developed the new morphological
and behavioral characteristics.
Standen et al. supported this hypothesis by comparing evidence from the fossil
record to the results from an experiment. They examined a set of transitional fossils and
identified a trajectory of morphological changes from stem to full-fledged tetrapods.
They predicted that if these changes originated as plastic responses to novel
environmental conditions, then plasticity in living relatives of stem tetrapods would
mirror the trajectory of morphological change in the fossil record.
To test this prediction, the researchers conducted an experiment with Polypterus,
a genus of fish that have lungs and are related to stem tetrapods. Polypterus can also
“walk” on land by vaulting their bodies over their pectoral (front) fins, which they use as
poles. The researchers raised a control group of fish in water and a treatment group on
land. After analyzing the walking behavior across groups, they discovered that compared
to the control, the treatment group's fins were planted closer to their bodies and slipped
less while planted on the ground. Treatment fish also displayed less unnecessary fin and
tail motion, meaning they used less energy as they moved. The scientists then looked for
morphological differences between the two groups and discovered that the treatment
group's pectoral bones differed from the control. In particular, the clavicle and cleithrum
bones were narrower and longer, the cavity where these bones connect to one another
was larger, and the connection between the pectoral bones and the skull appeared weaker.
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These morphological changes explained much of the increase in walking efficiency for
the treatment group.
Finally, when Standen et al. compared the morphology of the treatment group to
the morphology of stem tetrapod fossils, they found a strong correspondence between
Polypterus plasticity and the trajectory of tetrapod evolution. Transitional fossils exhibit
similar changes in clavicle and cleithrum shape, changes which researchers believe gave
early tetrapods more stability and flexibility when walking. The beginnings of a
separation of the pectoral bones from the skull is an important early step in the evolution
of necks.
In order for environmentally induced innovations in bone shape to translate into
macroevolutionary phenotypic change, they must be transmitted reliably from one
generation to the next, and they must continue to evolve. As long as the inducing
conditions reoccur in each generation, the plastic developmental responses will also
reoccur, which solves the problem of stable transmission. But how can induced plastic
responses become subject to cumulative selection? The solution to this problem is a
process called genetic assimilation, which occurs when changes in the genetic basis of an
induced trait make the trait even more adaptive.10
Gene regulatory networks are developmentally plastic, which means they can
adjust to environmental conditions and begin to produce a rare or new phenotypic variant
X instead of a common phenotypic variant Y without any changes in the genes
themselves. If the new phenotypic variant is adaptive and the environmental conditions
10 This is a special case of genetic evolution (change in allele frequencies across generations due to natural
selection) called genetic accommodation (West-Eberhard 2003, 140). For a more detailed review of the
distinction between genetic accommodation and assimilation, see Pigliucci et al. 2006).
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that induce it are stable over generations, natural selection will prefer it. The genotypes
that are capable of producing the adaptive variant will be increasingly represented, while
the genotypes that are not will dwindle. Over several tens of generations, the new
phenotype can become fixed, even without the appearance of any new genetic variants.
Subsequent mutations in the genetic basis of the induced phenotype that make the
phenotype more adaptive will have a selective advantage and spread. Selection for these
genetic changes transfers control of the phenotype from the environment to the genetic
system until the original inducing environment is no longer necessary for the
development of the trait. At this point, we say the trait has been genetically assimilated,
and the way is paved for the trait to figure in future episodes of adaptive evolution.
According to the Standen et al.'s hypothesis, genetic assimilation was an early
event in the evolution of the tetrapod limb. Subsequently, many, many genetic mutations
must have occurred in the way the replicator view imagines, but these mutations were not
the sole sources of phenotypic variation. Novel environmental conditions also supplied
variation by inducing plastic phenotypic responses, which the genetic system later
assimilated.
This hypothesis implies that non-replicator sources of variation are part of what
has made the tetrapod lineage so evolvable. Inducing environmental conditions are not
replicators, yet they can generate and accurately transmit variation. Stem tetrapods varied
with respect to pectoral bone shape. One of the channels for transmitting this variation
was the environment in which parents raised their offspring. Growing up in shallow water
caused stem tetrapods to resemble their parents more than they resembled tetrapods who
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lived in deeper waters. Inducing environments, therefore, are hereditary material, and
counter-examples to the replicator commitment.
Not only is the replicator commitment false, but also, the replicator view's
account of what makes an inheritance system evolvable suffers if the plasticity hypothesis
is true. Evolvability refers to the dispositional property of lineages to evolve complex
adaptations. In order to explain the evolution of the complex adaptation that is the
tetrapod limb, we must appeal to the non-replicators that generated and transmitted
variation. The replicator view is not, then, a sufficient account of the inheritance systems
that make life on this planet evolvable.
3.2. A replicator-based response
The replicator view is unable to respond adequately to the challenge from the
plasticity hypothesis without giving up on the replicator commitment. The reason is that
the view cannot account for the phenotypic variation produced by environmental
induction in terms of replicators alone. Some biologists have said that taking plasticity
seriously only requires a shift in which part of the evolutionary process we emphasize,
rather than a shift in our view of inheritance (Paaby and Rockman 2014), but this response is not
available to those who hold the replicator view.
This defense of the replicator commitment starts with the concept of cryptic
genetic variation. Cryptic genetic variation is genetic variation that does not have
phenotypic effects except under unusual environmental conditions (Paaby and Rockman
2014). Developmental systems can produce the same phenotype from a number of
different genetic variants by controlling gene activity, much like a canal channels water
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from different sources to the same endpoint. Biologists call this phenomenon canalization
(Waddington 1942). Since natural selection cannot act on genetic variation unless it is
expressed as phenotypic variation, canalization allows genetic mutations to accumulate in
a population without being exposed to selection. These cryptic variants are invisible
unless an extreme environment disrupts the mechanisms of canalization.
Invoking cryptic genetic variation is one way of explaining what happens when
environmental novelties induce novel phenotypic responses. Even without new genetic
variation, variation that was previously hidden in a population is exposed when
environmental conditions change. In the case of tetrapod evolution, new habitats merely
allowed a subset of genotypic variants in the population of stem tetrapods to express, for
the first time, a potential for developing narrower pectoral bones. What looks like a case
of new variation in phenotypes without new variation in replicators is actually the
revelation of cryptic replicator variants. The replicator view can thus respond to the
challenge from the plasticity hypothesis by saying that cryptic variants, not new
environmental conditions, are the sources of novel phenotypes.
This response is correct on two counts, but it does not succeed as a defense of the
replicator commitment. It is true that canalization is responsible for the homogenous
phenotypic expression of genetic variants. It is also true that stressful environmental
conditions can disrupt canalization and that as a result, cryptic genotypic variants can
express themselves as novel phenotypes. But it would be a mistake to infer from these
two facts that replicators are the sole sources of variation in cases of plastic phenotypic
novelty.
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To illustrate the mistake, I'll start with a thought experiment in which phenotypic
variation comes from a non-replicator source. Then I'll argue that the experiment is
analogous to certain real-world situations.
Imagine a population of asexual and genetically identical butterflies.11 If
there is any phenotypic variation within the population, it cannot be due to
variation in replicators. Initially, all the butterflies lay their eggs and feed
on the same species of plant. Developing butterflies have a genetically
controlled mechanism that causes them to imprint on whatever plant they
hatch on, so when they mature, they lay their eggs on that same kind of
plant. But a developmental fluke distorts the imprinting mechanism of one
lucky butterfly and causes her to lay her eggs on a new species of plant.
This new plant is more nutritious than the plant the rest of the butterflies
imprint on. When the lucky butterfly's eggs hatch, they eat the new plant's
leaves and reap fitness benefits because the new food source increases
their size. The lucky butterfly's offspring also imprint on the new plant,
which means that they lay their eggs on plants of the same species. Time
passes. The lucky butterfly's descendants continue to feed and reproduce
on the new plant species, and the resulting changes in body size and
fitness are passed from generation to generation.
This thought experiment demonstrates that there is no necessary connection
between evolutionarily significant phenotypic variation and variation in replicators.
Replicators are responsible for the butterflies' imprinting mechanisms, but they are also
invariant (by stipulation). The source of the phenotypic variation in body size and fitness,
then, can only be the leaves of the plants the butterflies eat, and these leaves are not
replicators. If they were, they would have to be selected in virtue of the contribution they
make to butterfly fitness. But they are not. The leaves that foster larger, fitter butterflies
do not benefit as a consequence. It is variation in the plants qua butterfly environment, in
combination with plasticity in the original lucky butterfly that produces a new, fitter
phenotypic variant.
11 This thought experiment comes from Mameli (2004), though he uses it to illustrate a somewhat
different point.
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Of course, real populations are not genetically invariant. Certain subpopulations
of real populations are, however, invariant with respect to the alleles that contribute to
particular phenotypes. These subpopulations are analogues of the lucky butterfly and her
descendants because they share the relevant alleles with respect to a trait of interest, yet
can develop different trait values, depending on the environmental conditions they
encounter. Within these subpopulations, there is variation in phenotype without
corresponding variation in the relevant replicators.
Such subpopulations are the appropriate unit for discussing the challenge from the
plasticity hypothesis to the replicator view. The points about cryptic genetic variation and
canalization are true, but they only show that new phenotypic variation is sometimes the
result of cryptic genetic variation on the scale of a whole population. There are still
subsets of populations that share the relevant replicators yet develop different phenotypes
in different environments. As long as this is true, then the challenge to the replicator view
still stands.
3.3. What the classical view lacks
Though the replicator commitment is false, the classical view does not offer a
fully satisfying alternative. Some variants prefer not to differentiate between types of
hereditary material at all: Godfrey-Smith, for example, eschews causal talk altogether,
preferring instead to understand inheritance in terms of of population-level parentoffspring covariances (2009, 168-172). Others, like Jablonka and Lamb, do individuate
different types of hereditary material and inheritance mechanisms, but their distinctions
do not map onto the relevant explanatory differences between replicators and non-
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replicators that the plasticity hypothesis reveals.12 Despite the value of such approaches,
they do not distinguish types of hereditary material in terms of their differing roles in the
transmission and generation of variation. They obscure the fact that whether a
developmental resource contributes more to cumulative selection or to the generation of
variation is due in large part to whether it has evolved to play its role in development.
I am persuaded by the replicator view's claim that there are no convincing
examples of powerful cumulative selection on non-replicators, and defenders of the
classical view seem to grant this as well. Recurring environmental features can transmit
phenotypic states such as narrower pectoral bones, but even when these environmental
features are stable over evolutionary time, we cannot explain incremental changes in
pectoral bone shape without also explicitly referencing replicators. Thus, we need nonreplicators to understand how the early manifestations of the novel phenotype first
appeared, but we also need the concept of hereditary material that is itself evolving
(replicators) to explain the continued trajectory of changes in pectoral bones.
The fact that replicators are not necessary for evolution by natural selection does
not remove the need for replicators in an account of inheritance. So far as we know,
replicators are the only realistic mechanism of cumulative selection. We can of course
imagine other mechanisms, but this is irrelevant so long as we have no reason to expect
these mechanisms actually exist, or are even biochemically possible.
In discussing the differences between their views, both Sterelny (2011a) and
Godfrey-Smith (2011) have advocated for theoretical pluralism: sometimes the replicator

12 See English et al. 2015, p. 12 for a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages mechanistic vs.
evolutionary approaches to inheritance.
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perspective is more explanatory, while at other times the classical view gives a better
account of the biological facts. While it is certainly true that we can choose to represent
replicators explicitly or not when we model biological phenomena, and that the details of
specific questions and research problems should guide that choice, it is also possible to
give a unified account of inheritance that retains the insights of both sets of views. Unlike
the alternative approaches, this unified account highlights the distinctive contributions of
different types of hereditary material to evolvability as well as the evolutionary
importance of interactions between the types.
4. Inducers
In this section I distinguish two categories of hereditary material and use
examples to illustrate the explanatory power and research value of an account of
inheritance that includes both categories. I also consider two objections to my proposal,
one motivated by the replicator commitment and one motivated by the classical
commitment.
4.1. General conditions on hereditary material
I have defined hereditary material as the developmental resources that cause
offspring to resemble their parents more than they resemble other members of the
population, and I have established that non-replicators can play this role. The next step in
developing an account of these non-replicators is to say what it is about some
developmental resources that allows them to function as hereditary material. I identify
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three conditions13 that jointly confer the status of hereditary material on developmental
resources.
The first condition is that a developmental resource vary along some dimension
such that, barring confounding causal influences, exposure to variation in the resource
causes variation in some phenotype; the second condition is that the resource has a stable
presence over multiple generations; and the third is that offspring encounter the resource
because parents transmit it to them. Not all developmental resources meet these
conditions, but those that do cause offspring to resemble parents more than they resemble
other members of the population. Therefore, they are hereditary material. Developmental
resources can satisfy these conditions in multiple ways, and how they do so is what
determines whether a resource is a replicator or an inducer. One consequence of this
approach is that being hereditary material is a relational property, and a resource becomes
or ceases to be hereditary material when it fulfills or stops fulfilling these conditions in
relation to a population of organisms.14
The first condition requires variation in a developmental resource to produce
variation in a phenotype. If we are considering a population in which there is no actual
variation in the availability of a resource, then we have inheritance of similarity, but not
inheritance of variation. An example is gravitational force. If organisms were to
experience variation in gravitational force, they would vary phenotypically as a result.

13 Mameli (2004) prefers to say that any developmental resource that generates “intergenerationally stable
phenotypic variation” is hereditary material. I agree, but think it is useful to separate the conditions
more explicitly.
14 In this respect, my view is similar to DST in that it emphasizes context dependency and interaction
effects. Yet I disagree with DST that thinking in terms of multiple inheritance systems rather (as
opposed to being more holistic) “pushes context dependency into the background” (Griffiths and Gray
2001, 197).
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But in reality, organisms experience uniform gravitational force, so it does not cause the
inheritance of variation. When a resource generates similarity but not variation, I will call
it a normalizer. Some accounts of inheritance count do count normalizers as hereditary
material. For example, defenders of DST have at times treated gravitational force as
inherited (Griffiths and Gray 2001), and NCT counts very long-term and widespread
bioturbation as an ecological inheritance (Odling-Smee and Laland 2011), while I do not.
The second condition requires that the developmental resource be stable. The
reason is that one-off events such as earthquakes can effect developing organisms, but the
effects do not have multigenerational significance. On the contrary, random and unstable
variations in the availability of developmental resources are likely to decrease parentoffspring resemblances rather than producing differential resemblances between lineages.
I will call these unstable developmental resources disrupters. Active migration, which
counts as ecological inheritance within NCT, falls into this category (Odling-Smee and
Laland 2011). There is likely no sharp cutoff for how long a resource must persist to be
considered stable, but genetic assimilation can occur within a few tens of generations, so
the boundary should be at least that low.
The third condition requires that parents transmit the developmental resource to
their children. This condition ensures that resemblances are in fact between parents and
offspring. If parents are not the reason that their offspring encounter a variationgenerating developmental resource, then the variation will not track parent-offspring
relationships, and natural selection will not have appreciable effects.15

15 Though I am focusing on one kind of parent-offspring relationship (reproduction), this third condition is
compatible with a more general conception of the parent-offspring relationship.
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Some developmental resources satisfy these conditions because they have evolved
specific means for doing so. The genome has been selected for high-fidelity copying with
occasional variation (Lynch 2010). Many of the instances of non-genetic inheritance that
Jablonka and Lamb call to our attention also appear to have evolved to be able to satisfy
these conditions. The transmission of epigenetic marks, for example, is understood as an
evolved inheritance mechanism. Such developmental resources are, of course, replicators,
and an account of inheritance should emphasize the remarkable fact that some hereditary
material has evolved to play the role that it plays.
Other developmental resources satisfy the conditions for being hereditary material
in the absence of evolved capacities for generating variation, maintaining a stable
presence, and transmitting themselves from generation to generation. An account of
inheritance should also emphasize this fact, as well as the fact that the transmission of
variation can be accomplished by both evolved and non-evolved mechanisms. I propose
that we adopt the term inducers (following West-Eberhard's (2003) work on
environmental induction) to refer to the developmental resources that function as
hereditary material without having evolved to do so.
Inducers: developmental resources that generate phenotypic variation, are
persistent or recurring rather than copied, and are transmitted from parents
to offspring.
Inducers such as temperature, salinity, nutrient availability, and prey size can all
generate variation simply by being distributed unevenly or along a gradient. Inducers
meet the stability condition not because they are copied, but because they either recur
(like the leaves in the lucky butterfly thought experiment) or persist through time (like the
semi-terrestrial environment encountered by stem tetrapods). Parents transmit inducers to
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their offspring by raising their offspring in environmental conditions similar to the ones
in which they themselves developed. There is no evolved transmission mechanism;
rather, the combination of a stable developmental resource and typical parental behaviors
is sufficient to reliably transmit variation.
Inducers' mechanisms of transmission may not achieve the copy-fidelity that
replication does, but they do not need to if genetic assimilation later transfers the control
of a phenotypic innovation from inducers to replicators. Genetic assimilation links
environmentally induced variation with replicator-based transmission so this variation
can be a part of the complex of adaptations needed to produce a phenotype as intricate as
the tetrapod limb. And, to the extent that genetic assimilation performs this function, such
adaptations cannot be accounted for without reference to inducers.
Whether a given resource is an inducer, disrupter, or normalizer will vary from
case to case. What functions as an inducer for one population may be a disrupter or a
normalizer for another population. A developmental resource's status may also vary both
with the size of the population and the scope of the evolutionary change under
investigation. Since these different types of developmental resource are continuous with
one another rather than discrete, there will likely be borderline cases that are empirically
difficult to classify, as well as instances of a resource transitioning from one role to
another.
4.2. Two types of hereditary material
In any case, this way of categorizing developmental resources implies that the
replicator commitment is false, while the classical commitment is too abstract.
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Replicators and inducers both satisfy the three conditions for being hereditary material,
so an account of inheritance should reflect this fact. Therefore, I propose we accept the
following commitment:
The revised replicator commitment: hereditary material consists of
replicators and inducers.
It is also be well within the scope of my account to recognize finer-grained distinctions
between various kinds of replicators and inducers, if there are explanatory benefits to
doing so. There may be reason, for example, to distinguish more explicitly between
inducers that persist and those that recur from generation to generation.
The primary advantages of the revised replicator commitment are that it offers an
increase in explanatory power and generates interesting research questions. It increases
explanatory power because it combines resources for understanding two different
components of evolvability (cumulative selection and the generation of variation) within
one framework. It suggests that having multiple modes of transmission, especially both
evolved and non-evolved modes, as well as the ability to switch from mode to another, is
part of what makes a lineage evolvable. The interaction between replicators and inducers
is central to Standen et al.'s hypothesis for the origin of terrestrial locomotion, and
focusing on such interactions may shed light on other puzzles of evolvability such as
variation in speciation rate (Rabosky 2015) and the emergence of social learning in
humans (Sterelny 2012).
The research questions that revising the replicator commitment generates are
questions about the relationships between replicators and inducers. I will give three
examples. First, what kinds of interactions are there between replicator-based and
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inducer-based inheritance systems? Genetic assimilation is one interaction, but there may
be others. Second, do developmental resources ever transition from being inducers to
being replicators? Replicators are evolved structures, but how, and from what, did they
evolve? Opponents often criticize the replicator view for ignoring this question (see, for
example, Griesemer et al. 2005). Biologists already recognize that the origin of DNA
replication is an important research topic, but we can also ask whether and how nongenetic replicators like nests and microorganisms' symbiotic functioning might have
evolved from inducer-based inheritance systems.
Third, what are the conditions under which inducers are favored over replicators,
and vice versa? In the case of genetic assimilation, the transmitting role eventually passes
from inducers to a replicators, but it is likely that there are also conditions under which
continued transmission by an inducer is actually more adaptive than transmission by a
replicator. For example, models of the conditions that favor genetic or social or
environmental transmission of variation (English et al. 2015) suggest that broader
patterns of pollen dispersal can prevent genetic determination of and instead favor
environmental control over germination time in plants.
These research questions arise quite naturally from my account of inheritance
since the distinction between replicators and inducers is built into it. Other accounts of
inheritance do not make it easy to ask these questions, either because they do not consider
inducers to be hereditary material at all, or because they ignore the important causal and
explanatory differences between replicators and inducers.
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4.3. Objections and replies
One objection to my critique of the replicator commitment is that we can
individuate the replicators in the tetrapod and lucky butterfly cases such that the sources
of phenotypic variation are in fact replicators, thus removing the need to reference
inducers in an explanation of either of these evolutionary episodes.16 What counts as a
replicator for the lucky butterfly is not the genes that produce the imprinting mechanism
(or the imprinting behavior itself), but those genes plus the specific type of plant on
which an individual butterfly imprints. Then there are two competing replicator lineages:
(1) the imprinting genes plus plant type A and (2) the imprinting genes plus plant type B.
The plant types are not replicators on their own, but we can see them as components of
replicators rather than separate developmental resources, and thus maintain that
replicators are the only hereditary material. If this objection succeeds, then my criticism
of the replicator view fails.
The strategy here is to identify the objects that clearly do copy themselves, such
as genes or nests, and then to see if variation in these objects corresponds to variations in
phenotypes. If so, we have identified the replicators, and we are done. If not, we keep
looking until we find the developmental resources that do correspond to variations in
phenotypes. We attach these developmental resources to the objects that copy themselves
and call these hybrid objects the replicators. The problem is that there is no obvious
reason for individuating replicators in this way other than saving the replicator view. If
the replicator view has some decisive advantages over the alternative, this might makes
sense, but since my revision does not deny the existence or importance of replicators,
16 Thanks to Carlos Santana for raising this objection.
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only their monopoly on the category of hereditary material, it is not clear what those
advantages are.
There are actually two reasons to prefer the revised replicator commitment to the
replicator commitment. I have already discussed the first one. It is that the focus of the
replicator view is on accounting for cumulative selection and complex adaptations. Its
primary concern is with the transmission of variation across generations. But this intense
focus on the transmission of variation obscures another important component of
inheritance: the generation of variation. We want an account of hereditary material that
makes space for both elements rather than one that emphasizes transmission at the
expense of generation. The replicator view may or may not be correct that cumulative
selection requires replication, and hence that new phenotypes, if they are to be important
in the evolution of more complex phenotypes, must be brought under the control of a
system of replicators. Regardless, if these new phenotypes can originate because of
inducers, and then over time become associated with replicator-based transmission
processes through genetic accommodation, then inducers have evolutionary significance
in their own right.
The second reason is that the replicator view runs together two importantly
different types of cases. Sometimes, as in the lucky butterfly case, organisms do not
actively manipulate the availability of an environmental resource, yet that resource still
generates variation. But there are other cases where organisms do manipulate elements of
their environment to make a certain resource more available. When animals build nests,
they reliably reorganize parts of their environment to provide shelter. In both of these
cases, environmental resources contribute to heritable phenotypic differences, but one
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case involves active manipulation of the environment, while the other does not. On the
replicator view, these cases are run together, but on my view, they are not. A nest is a
replicator, and a natal site is an inducer. This distinction will be especially important if
inducers ever become replicators. Understanding a transition from one type of hereditary
material to another requires us to recognize the distinction between types in the first
place.
A second objection to my proposal is that it is at best a slight variation on the
classical view rather than a distinctive proposal. In previous sections I have tried to show
that my view accomplishes something that versions of the classical view do not, but there
are certainly similarities between my view and the many conceptions of inheritance in the
literature, given that my account is meant to unify two historically opposed approaches.
The key difference, though, is that on my view, a satisfactory account of inheritance must
explicitly include replicators. The classical view is opposed to this. Jablonka and Lamb
(2005, 376) and Godfrey-Smith (2015, 1), in particular, have explicitly rejected the
concept.
This difference leads me to classify particular cases of non-genetic inheritance
differently than the classical view does. On my view, the genetic/non-genetic distinction
is much less important than the replicator/inducer distinction, so I see some forms of nongenetic inheritance as having more in common with genetic inheritance than they do with
the inheritance of inducers. I also disagree with some classical view proponents about
certain candidate instances of non-genetic inheritance. I doubt, for example, that
bioturbation or active migration constitute inheritance, a position which puts me in
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disagreement with proponents of ecological inheritance, and possibly also Jablonka and
Lamb (2005, 377-378).
I have also argued that shifting from the classical commitment to the revised
replicator commitment carries important consequences for the quality of explanations we
can give for various puzzles of evolvability, as well as for the direction of future research
on inheritance. There is still room to individuate inheritance systems mechanistically, as
Jablonka and Lamb do, or to model inheritance statistically rather than causally, as
Godfrey-Smith does, but the revised replicator commitment provides a better explanation
of inheritance than either the mechanistic or statistical approaches.
Despite these differences between the classical view and the revised replicator
commitment, my view is able to salvage what proponents of the classical view care the
most about: that an account of inheritance not be so focused on cumulative selection that
it loses sight of the importance of the generation of variation.
5. Conclusion
My argument for the revised replicator commitment depends on the plasticity
hypothesis being true. In this chapter, I have described the hypothesis rather than
defending it because I am content to show that if the plasticity hypothesis is true, then we
lose nothing but gain much by adopting the revised replicator commitment. There is,
however, considerable empirical evidence for the hypothesis (reviewed in Schlichting
and Wund 2014). We lose nothing because the revised replicator commitment retains the
replicator category as well as the emphasis on the generation of variation. What we gain
has both theoretical and practical dimensions.
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The theoretical advantages of the revision are twofold. First, we achieve an
abstract conception of inheritance that does not prejudge the still-open empirical question
about the relative significance of inducers in evolutionary history. Second, the revised
replicator commitment provides a starting point for integrating insights from historically
opposed theoretical perspectives on evolution. Eco-evo-devo and the EES have both
positioned themselves as rejections of the replicator view, in large part because they see
this its conception of inheritance as too narrow. In response to this criticism, proponents
of the replicator view have argued that giving up the replicator commitment would
compromise our understanding of evolvability by lumping most or all developmental
resources into a single, monolithic category. My revised replicator commitment takes
seriously the call to broaden the biological conception of inheritance, but does not
abandon what proponents deem central to the replicator perspective. In line with Ecoevo-devo and EES, the revised replicator commitment identifies environmental features
that are inherited. But it does so in a disciplined way that allows us to discriminate
between developmental resources that have different kinds of evolutionary consequences,
as well as those that have no evolutionary consequences at all.
I have already hinted at the practical advantage of my proposal, which is that it
opens up space to investigate the evolutionary role of inducers and their relationship to
replicators. Biologists' ability to explain the origin of innovations like the tetrapod limb
lags behind other areas of research in evolutionary biology (Moczek 2008). Evolutionary
innovation is a growing research area, and several authors (Pigliucci 2008; WestEberhard et al. 2011; Kaplan 2006) have suggested that advancing our understanding of
innovations as diverse as CAM photosynthesis, Hymenoptera caste differentiation, and
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bipedalism in hominids may depend on recognizing the role of plasticity and
environmental induction. If they are right, then revising the replicator view of inheritance
and incorporating inducers is a way forward for the study of innovations.
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Chapter 4: Underdetermination and Evidence in the Developmental Plasticity
Debate
1. Introduction

It is a striking fact of the biological world that phenotypic expression may be, and
often is, influenced by an organism's developmental environment. This means that two
genetically identical organisms raised in different environments can have different
physical characteristics, use different strategies to avoid predators and find food, and
even be of different sexes. Biologists increasingly recognize the importance of this
phenomenon, which they call developmental plasticity (Pigliucci 2001), but hypotheses
about its role in evolution are controversial.
Perhaps the most controversial hypothesis is that many important phenotypic
novelties owe their origins to developmental plasticity, because plasticity allows new
phenotypes to emerge prior to genetic mutations or recombination (West-Eberhard 2003).
This is the plasticity-first hypothesis. Biologists have long debated both its plausibility
and importance (e.g. Orr 1999; Pigliucci 2007; Gilbert and Epel 2009; Jablonka and Raz
2009; Futuyma 2011; Dickins and Rahman 2012; and Moczek 2015), in part because it
informs a broader controversy about the adequacy of central components of evolutionary
theory (Laland et al. 2015, p. 2). Philosophers, too, are interested in whether the
plasticity-first hypothesis poses a challenge to biological orthodoxy, but where they have
examined its theoretical implications,17 I am interested in an epistemic question: what
evidence do we need to settle the longstanding debate about the hypothesis?

17 Examples include an edited volume about the evolutionary significance of the Baldwin effect (Weber

59

I argue that the plasticity-first hypothesis is transiently underdetermined (Sklar
1975), that is, the presently available data does not confirm or disconfirm the plasticityfirst hypothesis because it does not discriminate between the plasticity-first hypothesis
and its theoretical rivals. Moreover, ancestral-descendent comparisons, which are the
most popular means of studying the plasticity-first hypothesis, do not on their own
generate the evidence needed to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis. Together, these
two facts explain why, even though the number of empirical studies about plasticity has
grown substantially in the last decade (Forsman 2015), the debate about the plasticityfirst hypothesis has reached a stalemate.
I offer a strategy for overcoming this underdetermination problem. Researchers
need to develop a richer middle range theory (Binford 1982; Jeffares 2008) of plasticityfirst evolution, one that allows them to identify distinctive empirical traces of the
hypothesis. Then they can search for those traces and use them to discriminate between
rival explanations of evolutionary episodes. The best tools for developing that middle
range theory are experimental evolution and formal modeling, not ancestral-descendant
comparisons.
My epistemic analysis also informs the theoretical side of the controversy over the
plasticity-first hypothesis. There is a deflationary interpretation of the debate on which
describing a particular evolutionary process as either an instance of plasticity-first or
gene-first evolution is simply a matter of taste (Wagner 2011, p. 182). This deflationary
view depends on the claim that there is no difference in the evolutionary patterns
and Depew 2003), articles about the theoretical integration of evolution and development (Sterelny
2000; Amundson 2005; Love 2006), and Kaplan (2006) on non-genetic inheritance and developmental
plasticity.
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generated by plasticity-first and gene-first mechanisms, and thus the distinction between
the two is explanatorily inert. The research strategy I suggest addresses this concern
about explanatory inertia by prioritizing the discovery of empirical differences between
the two kinds of mechanisms. Confirming the plasticity-first hypothesis and
demonstrating its scientific interest are thus related issues, and resolving them requires a
shift in evidence collecting methods and priorities.
2. The plasticity-first hypothesis and its rivals

I'll begin by introducing the plasticity-first hypothesis, its theoretical rivals, and
the controversy between them. The plasticity-first hypothesis proposes that because
organisms are developmentally plastic (i.e. sensitive to environmental inputs), a process
of environmental induction followed by genetic assimilation is an evolutionarily
significant mechanism for the emergence of phenotypic novelties (West-Eberhard 2003;
Moczek et al. 2011).18
It’s easiest to understand this hypothesis in light of an example. Stickleback are small fish
that inhabit oceans, lakes, streams, and estuaries throughout the northern hemisphere.
Stickleback from different habitats have different mouth shapes. Experiments have
shown that many of these differences are due to environmental factors rather than genetic

18 “Phenotypic novelty” is a term of art with a narrower meaning than “new phenotype.” To be considered
a novelty, a phenotype must differ from its predecessors in some important way, but the biological
literature is still divided on what is required for something to count as a novelty (for a review, see
Wagner and Lynch 2010). My conception follows Pigliucci's (2008), according to which novelties are
“new traits or behaviors, or novel combinations of new traits or behaviors, arising during the evolution
of a lineage, and that perform a new function within the ecology of that lineage” (p. 890). The
plasticity-first hypothesis is not committed to any one conception of novelty. Instead, the hypothesis
claims that plasticity-first evolution is part of the explanation for the origin of some traits which will
count as novelties on whatever conception(s) biologists adopt.
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ones. For instance, if you capture juvenile fish from a stream habitat and feed them
zooplankton rather than bloodworms, they will develop mouth phenotypes typical of
lake-dwelling fish (Lucek et al. 2014). Dietary changes can also induce fish from the
surface of a lake to develop mouths typical of fish that live on lake bottoms (Wund et al.
2008). Thus, stickleback are developmentally plastic for mouth shape.
When developmentally plastic individuals encounter new environmental
conditions, they sometimes develop new phenotypes in response (Waddington 1953;
1956), where a new phenotype is simply one that differs qualitatively or quantitatively
from the other phenotypes that a genotype has produced in the population's recent
history.19 This phenomenon is called environmental induction: the appearance (and
recurrence) of a new developmental variant which occurs when some new environmental
input affects a preexisting responsive phenotype, causing a phenotypic change or
reorganization (modified from West-Eberhard 2003, p. 140). Of course, all traits are
developmentally dependent on both genetic and environmental inputs, but the concept of
environmental induction is useful to biologists because it foregrounds the differencemaking role that the environment plays in some cases of development that it does not
play in other cases.
Environmental conditions do not only generate phenotypic variation; if they are
intergenerationally stable, they may allow for the transmission of phenotypic variation by
inducing it anew in each generation, as parents expose their offspring to developmental
environments similar to those in which they themselves matured. Suppose the inducing

19 Not all new phenotypes count as true phenotypic novelties, but they may still serve as the foundation for
the evolution of future novelties.
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conditions are stable across generations and the induced phenotypic variant is adaptive.
An example might be a population of stream-dwelling stickleback that migrate to a lake
and whose mouth phenotypes respond plastically to prey availability. Then natural
selection will prefer the induced phenotype. The genotypes that are capable of producing
the adaptive variant will become more frequent, while the genotypes that are not will
dwindle.20 This is genetic evolution (change in allele frequencies across generations due
to natural selection), but it does not require new genetic variants.21
Evolution by selection of an environmentally induced phenotype may not seem
powerful because the adaptive variants maintained by environmental induction are
fragile. If, for example, the stickleback population leaves the lake and migrates back to a
stream, the new mouth phenotype will disappear as environmental conditions change.
Insofar as evolutionary biology aims to explain the evolution of complex traits that
depend on the slow accumulation of phenotypic changes over long time periods and
varied environmental conditions, we may be skeptical of how relevant these traits can be.
There is, however, a further process called genetic assimilation22 that can reduce
the dependency of environmentally induced traits on their initial inducing conditions.
Genetic assimilation occurs when changes in the genetic basis of an induced trait make
the trait more adaptive, but less plastic. The more adaptive genetic variants have a
selective advantage, so they spread throughout the population, and the genetic system
20 Here I make the realistic assumption that there is genetic variation for plasticity in the population. If all
members of the population are equally plastic, then, of course, natural selection will not occur.
21 The term for this kind of evolution by selection of a phenotypic variant is genetic accommodation.
Though both environmentally and genetically induced variants can be genetically accommodated
(Crispo 2007), here I am interested only in genetic accommodation of environmentally induced traits.
22 A related process is called the Baldwin effect, but the Baldwin effect picks out cases in which plasticity
helps organisms survive in a new environment without being followed by plasticity loss or further
adaptation of the plastic trait(s) (Crispo 2007).
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gains more control over the environmentally induced trait. Eventually, the trait will
develop even in the absence of the original inducing conditions, meaning it is no longer
environmentally induced. Once this transfer of developmental control from the
environment to the genome occurs, the trait is more likely to figure in future episodes of
cumulative evolution.
A final component of the plasticity-first hypothesis that needs definition is
evolutionary significance. Advocates of the hypothesis are vague about the meaning of
this term, but as I understand it, their primary concern is the explanatory significance of
the plasticity-first hypothesis, meaning that the plasticity-first hypothesis provides part of
the answer to a central problem in evolutionary theory, the problem of how phenotypic
novelties emerge and spread.23 If plasticity-first evolution is explanatorily significant,
then a satisfactory resolution of the problem of novelty will invoke it as a key noveltygenerating mechanism. I am following the literature here by speaking of one general
problem of novelty in evolutionary theory (Muller and Wagner 1991), but it might also
be productive to approach the issue more narrowly, asking about the role of plasticityfirst evolution in the appearance of novelties in particular clades.
How do we determine if plasticity-first evolution is a key novelty-generating
mechanism, either in general or in particular clades? Frequency is one consideration, but
presumably plasticity-first evolution can be evolutionarily significant even if it is
somewhat rare. For example, if plasticity-first evolution has produced high-profile
phenotypic novelties such as limbs (Standen et al. 2014), bipedalism (Pigliucci 2008),

23 This conception of explanatory significance is drawn from Godfrey-Smith's (2001) analysis of
explanatory adaptationism and Orzack and Sober's (1994) I-adaptationism thesis.
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types of social learning (Sterelny 2012), or CAM photosynthesis (West-Eberhard et al.
2011), then these are reasons to think it meets the significance threshold. So, evidence for
the significance of the plasticity-first hypothesis can be evidence about either its
frequency or its role in the emergence of particular high-profile novelties.
Judgments of explanatory significance depend in part on philosophical considerations
about the nature of explanations, particularly historical explanations, but the issue is also
beset by empirical difficulties. These stem from the fact that it is challenging to
discriminate between plasticity-first evolution and alternative explanations for the
emergence of novelties. There are three of these alternative explanations: novelty from
coding mutations, novelty from non-coding (regulatory) mutations, and novelty from
recombination, which is the reshuffling of genetic material on or between chromosomes.
Unlike plasticity-first evolution, in which is phenotypes change before genes do, these
mechanisms all involve gene-first changes. It is difficult to determine which of these
mechanisms is responsible for any particular phenotypic novelty because researchers
have to make inferences about past events on the basis of presently available data, but
both phenotype-first and gene-first mechanisms produce the same evolutionary
outcomes—phenotypic novelties and genetic adaptations. Researchers need additional
evidence to confirm or disconfirm the plasticity-first hypothesis, but there is no
consensus on what data would be sufficient for this purpose.

3. Evidential disagreements
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The scientific debate about the plasticity-first hypothesis is dominated by two
issues: the quality of direct versus indirect evidence and proper placement of the burden
of proof. In this section I show that, in focusing on these issues, the debate has neglected
substantive questions about what data would qualify as confirmatory evidence for
plasticity-first evolution and how to obtain such evidence. I also identify two evidential
standards that need to be met in order for the plasticity-first hypothesis to be confirmed.
First, the evidence must be discriminatory, i.e., for at least some novelties, it must favor
the plasticity-first explanation over the alternative gene-first explanations. Second, the
evidence must be relevant to the significance claim embedded in the hypothesis.
3.1 Direct and indirect evidence
Advocates of the plasticity-first hypothesis characterize the evidence for their
position as indirect, rather than direct (West-Eberhard 2003; Pigliucci and Murren 2003).
They argue that plasticity-first evolution, like many other evolutionary mechanisms, is
difficult to observe directly, and therefore, it is unreasonable to ask (as some skeptics do)
for direct evidence for the hypothesis before accepting it. Instead, researchers can test the
hypothesis by collecting indirect evidence. This indirect evidence usually consists of
comparisons between ancestral and descendant populations (i.e., studies that compare
characteristics of a descendant population to those of an ancestral one). Scientists less
friendly to the plasticity-first hypothesis criticize the reliance on indirect evidence (de
Jong 2003; 2005). In fact, there is a long tradition of skepticism about plasticity-first
evolution that continues despite detailed reviews showcasing the latest empirical work on
the topic (Wund 2012; Schlichting and Wund 2014).
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For all their disagreements, skeptics and advocates do agree that the distinction
between direct and indirect evidence generates the controversy about the evidential status
of the plasticity-first hypothesis. Advocates accept indirect evidence as confirmatory;
skeptics do not; and both sides are aware of this. But what exactly is direct evidence?
That is far from clear. In fact, there are as many as four different and plausible
interpretations of the direct/indirect distinction.
The first and most straightforward interpretation of the distinction is that
obtaining direct evidence means actually observing the hypothesized event happen in the
wild (though additional laboratory experiments may be needed to supplement these
observations). All other evidence, by contrast, is indirect. Call this the distinction
between direct and indirect observation.24. It is tempting to read the skeptics' demand for
direct evidence as demands for direct observation, especially calls for a “crucial
laboratory experiment” (de Jong 2003, p. 17) to confirm the hypothesis. Direct
observation is not, however, the typical standard against which evidence for an
evolutionary hypothesis is judged, so it is perhaps unfair to interpret skeptics as calling
for it. Inferences about the occurrence of natural selection in the wild are rarely direct in
this sense (Endler 1986), nor is research on speciation (Wund 2012). Though there are
rare exceptions (Grant and Grant 2009), biologists almost never witness speciation events
from beginning to end. If the skeptics' really are appealing to direct observation in their

24 I am offering this as a plausible interpretation of the direct/indirect evidence distinction as it arises in
the debate about plasticity-first evolution, not as an endorsement of the idea that laboratory observations
are not direct observations. In Section 5 I will discuss the role of laboratory observations, particularly
laboratory natural selection, in resolving this debate.
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criticisms of plasticity-first evolution, then they are holding the hypothesis to an
unreasonably high standard.
A second interpretation of the skeptics' calls for direct evidence is that they want
evidence for the occurrence of plasticity-first evolution in particular cases to discriminate
between plasticity-first evolution and the alternative mechanisms that can also produce
new phenotypes. On this interpretation, direct evidence is discriminatory; to be
considered direct evidence, a dataset must favor the plasticity-first explanation for the
emergence of a particular novelty over the alternative gene-first mechanisms. Indirect
evidence, by contrast, is data that is consistent with plasticity-first evolution, but not
discriminatory. On this construal, demanding direct evidence for the plasticity-first
hypothesis is completely reasonable. In fact, from the perspective of confirmation theory,
data that is not direct in this sense is not evidence at all. When data fails to discriminate,
it fails to provide evidence, and the result is a kind of underdetermination problem called
contrast failure (Forber 2009). If this is what skeptics mean when they call for “clear
empirical evidence” (Santos et al. 2015, p. 128) and “direct support,” (de Jong 2005),
then they are simply denying that the advocates have offered discriminatory evidence for
the plasticity-first hypothesis.
Yet another way of drawing the distinction between direct and indirect evidence is
to say that direct evidence for the plasticity-first hypothesis must be relevant to the
significance claim embedded in the hypothesis. If evidence merely raises the probability
that plasticity-first evolution occurred in this or that particular case but does not speak to
overall significance, it is indirect. This conception of direct evidence allows skeptics to
concede that some evidence for plasticity-first evolution is discriminatory, but still deny
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that this evidence is significance-relevant because it does not tell us how frequent
plasticity-first evolution is or whether it is responsible for high-profile evolutionary
novelties. Direct evidence as significance-relevant evidence is a plausible interpretation
of at least some of the plasticity-first skeptics. See, for example, Wray et al.'s call to
“strengthen the evidence for [the] importance” (in Laland et al. 2014, p. 164) of
phenotypic plasticity.
Though interpreting the skeptics as calling for either discriminatory or
significance-relevant evidence is both charitable and plausible, it is clear that neither of
these is the distinction advocates have in mind when they talk about direct and indirect
evidence. Advocates of the plasticity-first hypothesis do not make the claim that the
hypothesis should be adopted on the basis of evidence that lacks discriminatory power or
fails to address the significance of plasticity-first evolution. Rather, their claim is that
indirect evidence can be both discriminatory and significance-relevant.
Advocates use the distinction between direct and indirect evidence in two
different ways. First, they sometimes mean that direct evidence is observationally direct,
as in Pigliucci and Murren's (2003, p. 1462) reference to catching genetic assimilation “in
the act.” Second, they sometimes interpret calls for direct evidence as calls to
demonstrate each element of the larger plasticity-first hypothesis within one model
system or, even more stringently, in a single study. According to Wund and Schlichting
(2014), such integrated evidence is desirable, but not a requirement on confirmatory
evidence. Wund argues that asking for such a demonstration in one study is a “flawed
expectation” (2012, p. 6), because, like the observational directness requirement, it holds
the plasticity-first hypothesis to a higher standard than that used for analogous
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hypotheses. What advocates are sometimes defending when they speak about indirect
evidence, then, is that it is possible to obtain discriminatory evidence in a piecemeal
fashion by splitting the larger plasticity-first process into smaller units and then
investigating these units across different experiments and model systems.
These four different ways of distinguishing between direct and indirect evidence
are blurred together in the plasticity-first debate. Advocates talk about direct evidence
both in terms of direct observation and integration. These may also be the conceptions of
directness that skeptics have in mind, but if they are, then important questions about the
extent to which the data on plasticity-first evolution is discriminatory and significancerelevant are ignored. Alternatively, if skeptics are arguing that evidence for plasticity-first
evolution needs to be discriminatory and/or significance-relevant, then they are indeed
raising important questions about confirmation, but the two sides are talking past one
another. In either case, the debate has yet to produce a clear discussion of whether the
data on plasticity-first evolution manages to be discriminatory or significance-relevant.
And such a discussion is critical to understanding the relationship between the plasticityfirst hypothesis and the evidence for it.
3.2 Burden of proof
One way in which advocates have tried to address worries about discriminatory
evidence is by claiming that there is often evidential parity between plasticity-first
hypothesis and its theoretical rivals; that is, that phenotype-first mechanisms and genefirst mechanisms enjoy comparable levels of evidential support in many particular cases.
This burden of proof argument concedes that we often do not know whether a
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population's evolutionary history involved genetic assimilation, but it claims we that also
do not know whether and how often that population has evolved novelties by gene-first
mechanisms (Pigliucci et al. 2006). Biologists have long assumed that the gene-first
mechanisms account for most if not all phenotypic novelties, but only because there was
no alternative hypothesis that fit the available evidence. But now the plasticity-first
hypothesis presents just such an alternative. As a result, we have learned that some data
once thought to support the occurrence and significance of gene-first evolutionary
mechanisms is not actually fine-grained enough to discriminate between phenotype-first
and gene-first explanations.
According to the burden of proof argument, when skeptics talk as though the
evidence for gene-first mechanisms greatly outweighs the evidence for phenotype-first
mechanisms, they are overlooking the fact that the mere construction of a plausible rival
hypothesis can create an underdetermination problem, independent of the strength of the
evidence for that rival hypothesis. It is important not to overstate this burden of proof
claim, however. Unless advocates of plasticity-first evolution mean to make the radical
assertion that there is no evidence for gene-first mechanisms that is not subject to a
plasticity-first interpretation, the most the argument can do is lead us to adjust our priors
concerning the plausibility of plasticity-first evolution, not deliver evidential parity across
the board.
In any case, the burden of proof argument is a double-edged sword. If, as
advocates generally concede, gene-first and phenotype-first explanations are often
underdetermined relative to the present evidence, the argument does not give us reason to
accept the plasticity-first hypothesis. At best, we should suspend judgment about the
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relative importance of gene-first and phenotype-first mechanisms because we do not have
evidence that can help us determine which mechanism was active in particular
evolutionary episodes, much less give us information about the relative frequency and
significance of these mechanisms. It is therefore important to face the issues of
discriminatory and significance-relevant evidence head-on. It is to these issues that I turn
next. There are substantive questions about confirmation and the plasticity-first
hypothesis that the debate surrounding the hypothesis has not addressed. How can they be
resolved?
4. The importance of middle range theory

In this section I argue that to be in a position to say what data would be
discriminatory and significance-relevant, researchers need a richer middle range theory of
plasticity-first evolution, one that allows them to identify its distinctive empirical traces. 25
A middle range theory is a theory of the relationship between a process of interest and the
observable evidence it produces (Binford 1982; Jeffares 2008). Such a theory allows
scientists to guard against false positives and false negatives, and to address worries
about the degradation of evidential traces over time.
First I revisit the possibility of confirming the hypothesis by observing it in a
natural population. I have already claimed that this sense of direct evidence is an
unreasonably high evidential standard, and that it is a mistake to say that only
observations of natural populations count as direct. Here, I show that such evidence is

25 These traces need not be unique, just distinct enough to allow us to discriminate between the plasticityfirst hypothesis and the competing alternative explanations for the origin of evolutionary novelties.

72

also unable to confirm the plasticity-first hypothesis because it so rarely yields
discriminatory evidence. Then I show that for similar reasons, ancestral-descendant
comparisons, the most popular means of studying plasticity-first evolution, are not
sufficient to confirm the hypothesis as long as our middle range theory remains as
rudimentary as it currently is.
4.1 Direct observation
Skeptics and advocates agree that the ideal way to gather evidence about
plasticity-first evolution would be to watch it happen, and though demanding this ideal is
unreasonable, there is still value in thinking about what researchers would have to
observe in the ideal case in order to conclude that plasticity-first evolution was occurring.
To observe environmental induction and genetic assimilation in real time, biologists
would first need to identify a population undergoing rapid evolution in the wild. In such a
population, there are seven observations which, taken together, would establish that a
novel trait evolved by plasticity-first evolution rather than some competing alternative
mechanism:

(i) Emergence of a novel phenotype: some members of the population develop a
phenotype (e.g. smaller eyes or narrower pectoral bones) that was not
formerly present in the population and which performs a new function in the
ecology of the lineage.
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(ii) Presence of an inducer: the population experiences a novel and
intergenerationally stable environmental condition such as a change in
salinity, conductivity, temperature, or nutrient availability.
(iii) Causal link between inducer and novel phenotype: the inducer is the differencemaker between the novel phenotype emerging or not emerging.
(iv) Adaptiveness of the novel phenotype: the novel phenotype has a fitness benefit in
the novel environment.
(v) Genetic basis of the novel phenotype: the same genetic variants that underpin the
novel phenotype were associated with a different phenotype before the
introduction of the inducer.
(vi) Spread of the novel phenotype: the adaptive phenotype must spread throughout
the population.
(vii)

Subsequent selection on the novel phenotype: once (or as) the novel
phenotype spreads, changes in its genetic basis that further improve its form,
function, or regulation are selected, leading to the persistence of the novel
phenotype even in the absence of the original inducer.
Pursuing such direct confirmation of the plasticity-first hypothesis has a number

of disadvantages. First, biologists must have the good fortune to catch a natural
population in the act of rapid evolution, as well as the ability to identify in advance what
trait to measure. As challenging as this seems, it may not be impossible (Moczek 2007).
Second, provided biologists can pass this first hurdle, the ensuing research would be
difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Third, it is a forward-looking approach, and
cannot tell us about evolutionary episodes that have already happened. If direct
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observation were the only evidence-gathering option, then we would not be able to
answer questions about plasticity-first evolution versus some alternative in particular
historical cases. Finally, one or two or even ten direct observations do not amount to
confirmation of the significance claim embedded in the plasticity-first hypothesis except
in the unlikely event that the observation is of a high-profile novelty.26
To demonstrate evolutionary significance, we have to be able to generalize
beyond a few observations and make inferences about how often and under what
conditions plasticity-first evolution occurs. Making these inferences requires more
information than the mere fact of direct observations. Thus, even if successful, direct
observation is not significance-relevant and so does not confirm the plasticity-first
hypothesis. Direct observations might be very powerful evidence if combined with
additional data generated by other methodological approaches, but they do not, in
isolation, have much confirmatory power.
The conceit of the idealized data set also highlights the difficulties of using
techniques other than direct observation to confirm the plasticity-first hypothesis. The
primary difficulty is that induction and assimilation occur quickly (probably over several
tens of generations), and such transient processes do not leave stable and easily detectable
empirical traces in their wake. Most of the evidence of past evolution that is readily
accessible tells us only that both genes and phenotypes change over time, but not the
order in which those changes occur.

26 I say “unlikely” because novelties such as the tetrapod limb take many, many human lifetimes to
evolve.
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In the case of direct observation, researchers' ability to collect dynamic, rather
than static, data (Forber 2009; Lewontin 2002) could provide insight into the ordering of
genetic change and phenotypic change. The challenge for other evidence gathering
techniques is to devise approximations of dynamic data from static data. This, of course,
is a problem common to the historical sciences rather than a unique issue for the
plasticity-first hypothesis. The general solution to the problem requires researchers to
search out physical traces left by past events. Their goal is to find a signature: a trace or
set of traces that uniquely picks out one of the mechanisms under consideration.
Sometimes, a single trace, or “smoking gun” may serve to discriminate between
alternatives, though more often, multiple independent traces must converge in order to
rule out one alternative and confirm another (Cleland 2002; Forber and Griffith 2011;
Currie forthcoming). Of course, there is no guarantee that every mechanism or process of
interest has a signature (Turner 2007), but it often happens that methodological and
technical advances uncover confirming traces that scientists previously believed were
inaccessible (Currie 2015; Turner 2016).
How can researchers identify the signature of a process like plasticity-first
evolution? This is where middle range theory becomes important. When the distinctive
empirical traces of a process are not apparent, researchers must invest in developing a
theory about the relationship between the process they are interested in and the
observable evidence the process produces. Once armed with the appropriate middle range
theory, researchers can confirm plasticity-first evolution in particular cases without
directly observing it. They can determine which data is actually discriminatory, and then
design studies of evolutionary episodes that seek out the relevant signature. When they
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find the signature, they can rule out alternative explanations and conclude that plasticityfirst evolution has occurred.
Even more importantly, the signature of plasticity-first evolution can assist
researchers in the project of making generalizations about evolutionary significance.
They can use the signature to compile a database of individual cases of plasticity-first
evolution, as well as confirmed cases of gene-first novelties, and then use this database to
support inferences about the frequency of plasticity-first evolution, what if any distinctive
modes and tempos of evolution it produces, and the probability that particular highprofile novelties emerged due to plasticity-first evolution. This kind of information is
necessary to respond to skeptics who worry that the distinction between plasticity-first
evolution and gene-first evolution is explanatorily inert.
4.2 Ancestral-descendant comparisons
Unfortunately, research on plasticity-first evolution is not focused on developing
middle range theory or characterizing a signature. Advocates have identified one
empirical trace which under certain conditions provides discriminatory evidence for
plasticity-first evolution, and they focus instead on carrying out ancestral-descendant
comparisons, i.e. studies that compare characteristics of a descendant population to those
of an ancestral one, that provide this kind of evidence.27 Researchers may compare
genomic information, when it is available, but most often they test for plasticity in the
development of particular traits. When (a) a descendant population has phenotypically

27 Of course, researchers cannot look at the literal ancestral populations (because they are dead), but must
identify extant populations that are reasonable analogs of the true ancestors. Identifying such proxy
ancestral populations is a general problem in evolutionary biology rather than a problem that is
particular to the plasticity-first hypothesis, so I will not take it up in this chapter.
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diverged from its ancestors in ways that appear to be adaptive and (b) the ancestral
population shows plasticity for the trait(s) that have evolved in the descendants,
researchers take this as evidence that induced plastic responses in the ancestors drove
subsequent evolution in their descendants.28
But the inferences one can draw from these comparative studies are more limited
than advocates admit. There are two reasons. First, many ancestral-descendant
comparisons are not discriminatory because they provide evidence about either
environmental induction or genetic assimilation, but not both. Second, those studies that
are discriminatory are too rare to support inferences about evolutionary significance.
In order to rule out a gene-first explanation for a particular novelty, a study needs
to show that both environmental induction and genetic assimilation occurred in the same
population. It is not sufficient to show the independent occurrence of just one or the
other, because the independent occurrence of either of these processes is compatible with
a gene-first explanation for phenotypic novelty.
Consider the stickleback example from Section 2. Recently diverged lake and
stream stickleback populations have adaptive differences in mouth shape, and you can
experimentally induce the lake phenotype in stream-dwelling fish (and vice versa). This
case provides compelling evidence for adaptive plasticity in both stickleback populations.
But it does not allow us to make inferences about plasticity-first evolution in these
populations. The newer mouth phenotype may be the precursor to a true evolutionary
novelty, or it may not. At present, the descendant stickleback population is as plastic as

28
The full set of data that researchers look for is a bit more detailed (see Levis and Pfennig 2016),
but these are the key findings.
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the ancestral one, meaning that genetic assimilation has not occurred. We have no
evidence that any genetic changes have occurred to make the adaptive new phenotype
more stable, that the induced response is on its way to becoming constitutive, that the
stickleback population(s) will become less plastic with respect to this trait in the future,
or that the new phenotype will figure in their subsequent evolution.
A second example is Carol Lee's work on marine copepod invasions of freshwater
habitats, work which supports conclusions about genetic assimilation, but not
environmental induction. In order to invade a freshwater habitat, these tiny marine
crustaceans must evolve new ion regulation mechanisms. Lee et al. (2011) studied the
role of two enzymes (V-type H ATPase and Na/K ATPase) involved in copepod ion
transportation and showed that copepods from marine habitats in the Atlantic Ocean and
Gulf of Mexico rapidly evolved increased plasticity for enzyme function when exposed to
freshwater conditions. This increased plasticity was adaptive because it improved the
copepods' ability to survive in freshwater. Further, copepod populations that have already
made the transition from seawater to freshwater show less plasticity for enzyme function
than Lee's experimental populations, supporting the conclusion that these invading
populations have genetically assimilated a previous plastic response. But it's an open
question whether plasticity in the original invaders existed before the invasion, or if a
regulatory mutation following the invasion increased plasticity (a gene-first mechanism).
If anything, the study supports the latter possibility, since Lee's experimental population
evolved increased plasticity for ion regulation after exposure to novel salinity levels
rather than demonstrating plasticity immediately.
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Advocates cite these examples, and others like them, as evidence for the
plasticity-first hypothesis. In a sense, they are correct. Ancestral-descendant comparisons
support the plasticity-first hypothesis by deepening our understanding of how and when
developmental plasticity, environmental induction, genetic assimilation occur. By
demonstrating individual components of the hypothesis, these studies also lend
plausibility to the claim that the entire process occurs in nature sometimes. They help to
build a circumstantial case for plasticity-first evolution. But circumstantial evidence isn't
good enough, because the plasticity-first hypothesis does not merely claim that plasticityfirst evolution probably occurs in nature sometimes. It claims that plasticity-first
evolution is an evolutionarily significant novelty-generating mechanism. To support that
claim, we need to be able to connect the plasticity-first process to particular novelties,
and that requires us to be able to discriminate between gene-first and phenotype-first
explanations in particular cases (some researchers do recognize this explicitly, see Levis
and Pfennig 2016).
The second problem with ancestral-descendant comparisons is that even when
they are discriminatory, there are very few candidate model systems that can support
conclusions about evolutionary significance, and these model systems have special
characteristics which make it difficult to generalize from them. Ancestral-derived
comparisons require recently diverged population pairs in which the descendants have
adaptively diverged from the ancestors. Adaptive radiations (e.g. African cichlid fish and
stickleback) and recent invasions (e.g. copepods and tiger snakes) are good sources for
such pairs, but there are many additional features that populations need to have that
further narrows down the set of good candidates for an integrated demonstration of
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plasticity-first evolution (Levis and Pfennig 2016). If we want to be able to make
inferences about older evolutionary novelties or about novelties that did not originate in
the context of invasions or adaptive radiations, special cases are of limited value. Even if
researchers can demonstrate plasticity-first evolution in each of these model systems,
they still need a way to leverage these demonstrations into sources of evidence about
other evolutionary episodes to which our access is more limited. So there is an important
gap between discriminatory evidence and significance-relevant evidence. The best way
to bridge this gap is to search for additional empirical traces of plasticity-first evolution.
If we identify additional traces, we can expand the set of confirmed cases of plasticityfirst evolution that forms the basis for significance judgments. That's why it is important
to enrich the middle range theory of plasticity-first evolution. We need to build up our
understanding of how the process occurs and the kinds of marks it leaves on the world so
that we can identify tokens of the process when we encounter them and tell tokens of
different processes apart.
There are a couple of ways to enrich the middle range theory and find more
traces. One approach, which would not require much of a shift from researchers' current
methodology, is to continue doing ancestral-descendant comparisons, but to look for
additional traces in model systems where it is already established that plasticity-first
evolution has occurred. These additional traces might then be identifiable in other natural
populations, even ones that are not ideal for conducting ancestral-derived comparisons.
Researchers have not yet tried this strategy, perhaps because there are still no
uncontroversial demonstrations of plasticity-first evolution in a natural population (Levis
and Pfennig 2016).
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Other approaches to characterizing the signature of plasticity-first evolution
depart more significantly from existing methodological norms. In fact, they go against
truisms about quality of evidence espoused by many researchers. The approaches I have
in mind are experimental evolution and formal modeling.
5. Adjusting methodological norms

Researchers recognize that formal models and experimental evolution can
contribute to the study of plasticity-first evolution, but they also grant epistemic priority
to data from natural populations. According to Schlichting and Wund (2014), “Ancestraldescendant or sister taxon comparisons provide the strongest evidence that genetic
accommodation is frequent in nature” (p. 665-6). They also write that:
Although experimental evolution studies provide definitive evidence for
demonstrating both the possibility and mechanisms of genetic
accommodation, evidence from natural populations is preferable for
indicating the prevalence of this process in nature (p. 660-661).
Similarly, Levis and Pfennig (2016) tell us that “studying the plasticity-first hypothesis in
lab populations of rapidly evolving organisms would be worthwhile but would not clarify
whether plasticity has contributed to adaptation in any natural population” (p. 3).
These biologists are correct that we must ultimately refer to data from natural
populations to assess the historical evolutionary significance of plasticity-first evolution.
But in drawing this conclusion, they discount the critical role of other methodological
techniques in determining what kind of data from natural populations they should look
for. This discounting shows up not only in their explicit statements about evidence, but in
their concrete research recommendations as well. And it echoes the deep-seated yet

82

dubious idea that certain kinds of experiments enjoy some in-principle epistemic
privilege relative to other investigative techniques (Parke 2014).
Such discounting is a mistake because, though the literature on plasticity offers
some clues about what additional traces of plasticity-first evolution might be, the area is
largely uncharted territory. One suggestion is that the time scale of plasticity-first
evolution is much shorter than that of gene-first mechanisms (Lande 2009). If so,
researchers may be able to make inferences about which process is more likely in cases
where they have information about the rate of evolution. Authors also occasionally
reference a possible genomic signature of plasticity-first evolution that distinguishes it
from gene-first processes. Characterizing such a signature would allow for inferences and
generalizations that go beyond those licensed by ancestral-derived comparisons.
The ease of suggesting and imagining possible signatures of plasticity-first
evolution raises the question of how these possibilities can be tested. Researchers are,
after all, in a paradoxical position. In order to identify distinctive characteristics of
plasticity-first evolution, they need clear cases of plasticity-first evolution to observe and
manipulate. But in order to identify such cases, they need some prior knowledge about its
distinctive characteristics.
This chicken and egg problem arises because it is almost prohibitively difficult to
identify cases of plasticity-first evolution in nature. But there is another option:
researchers can construct cases of plasticity-first evolution for themselves. Experimental
evolution and formal modeling confer this ability. Not only do they allow researchers to
construct cases of plasticity-first evolution, they make it possible to observe plasticityfirst processes in real time, not just once, but many times over. Thus, these techniques
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allow for more direct observation and manipulation of plasticity-first evolution than
comparative studies do. They are better suited for the tasks of developing middle range
theory and characterizing the signature of plasticity-first evolution than studies of natural
populations are.
To illustrate the value of the formal modeling and experimental evolution, I will
discuss the case of selective sweeps, in which these techniques are already helping to
elucidate the signatures of evolutionary processes. Then I will consider how an extension
of this approach could contribute to the study of plasticity-first evolution. The growing
literature on how to assess the plasticity-first hypothesis has not seriously entertained the
kind of strategy I am advancing here, but the limitations of comparative studies demand
that we combine them with different approaches.
5.1 Formal modeling and experimental evolution
Before introducing the selective sweep example, I will review the modeling and
experimental techniques I have in mind. Both traditional quantitative genetic models and
agent-based simulations are useful for investigating the signature of plasticity-first
evolution. Quantitative genetic models can generate empirically testable predictions
about the differences between gene-first and phenotype-first processes, predictions which
can guide future experimental set-ups and parameter choices. For instance, the prediction
that plasticity-first evolution is more rapid than gene-first evolution comes from the
quantitative genetic literature (Lande 2009; Frank 2011).
Simulations, by contrast, allow biologists to set up both phenotype-first and
genotype-first evolutionary scenarios, run them thousands of times, and then look for

84

interesting differences in outcome between the two kinds of scenarios. If they can be
externally validated, these differences will be diagnostic of plasticity-first evolution in
natural populations. An intriguing example of this kind of strategy comes from Draghi
and Whitlock (2012), who simulated evolution of a gene-network model in three different
of environments. They use the model to investigate the genetic basis of traits that have
evolved as plastic responses to environmental variation, but it's an approach that could
also investigate plasticity-first evolution and identify features of plasticity first evolution
that differ from gene-first evolution.
Experimental evolution is “research in which populations are studied across
multiple generations under defined and reproducible conditions, whether in the laboratory
or in nature” (Garland and Rose 2009, p. 3). This broad definition encompasses a range
of experimental techniques as varied as artificial selection, laboratory natural selection,
habitat alteration, and monitoring invasive species. What sets these approaches apart is
their ability to generate dynamic, rather than static, data about a population's response to
selection (Parke, in preparation).
Of these experimental techniques, artificial selection, which involves breeding
populations in a laboratory setting and selecting for a particular trait each generation,
have played an outsized role in research on plasticity-first evolution. Some of the earliest
empirical investigations of the hypothesis were artificial selection experiments.
Waddington (1953; 1956) reduced the activity of the Hsp90 protein (Rutherford and
Lindquist 1998) by exposing fruit fly larvae to heat shock, which induced a new
phenotype: wings without cross-veined patterns. After several generations of artificial
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selection for this phenotype, it developed consistently even without the heat shock
treatment that originally induced it.29
Today, Waddington's study is regarded as the classic proof of possibility of
genetic assimilation, but the artificial selection method suffers from two limitations
which consign results such as Waddington's to second-best status in the eyes of many
researchers. First, the novel phenotype Waddington induced is not adaptive. Second, it is
not clear whether the inducing condition, heat shock, is one that a natural population of
fruit flies would ever encounter. These two limitations highlight what many see as a more
general drawback of artificial selection experiments—the difficulty of using them to
make inferences about selective processes in nature (Rohner et al. 2013).
Laboratory natural selection (LNS) is an approach that circumvents these
limitations. In LNS, “the experimenter divides replicate lines among two or more
environmental treatments and examines how the experimental stocks respond over time”
(Fuller et al. 2005, p. 391). The key difference between artificial selection and LNS is
that the experimenter does not choose which individuals will reproduce in each
generation. As a result, any phenotypic novelties that emerge over the course of the
experiment are adaptive responses to the experimental population's environmental
treatment. If these environmental treatments are reasonable approximations of selection
pressures the experimental population might encounter outside the lab, then the
limitations of artificial selection experiments are not problems for LNS.
LNS should be more common because it is an ideal method for characterizing the
signature of plasticity.30 Once researchers have evolved a novel phenotype and then
29 See Suzuki and Nijhout 2006, 2008 for additional examples of artificial selection studies.
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confirmed the mechanism by which it occurred (gene-first or phenotype first.), they can
go back and reexamine data from each time-step of the process in search of distinctive,
identifying patterns. They can even contrast cases in which different mechanisms
predominate and look for divergences between them.
5.2 An example: selective sweeps
These techniques—quantitative genetic models, simulations, and LNS—have all
contributed to attempts to find empirical differences between adaptation from standing
genetic variation and adaptation from new (de novo) mutations. This project is related to
plasticity-first research, but the contrast between standing variation and de novo
mutations does not perfectly overlap the one between gene-first and phenotype-first
mechanisms. De novo mutation includes both coding and non-coding mutations, while
standing variation includes cases of recombination, environmental induction, and
selection of phenotypes that already exist in a population at low frequency (so, not
novelties at all). So, when biologists ask about the relative frequency of adaptation from
standing genetic variation, they are asking about something importantly different from
plasticity-first evolution. Still, the techniques that are helping to identify the first kind of
signature may also help characterize the second.
Biologists try to distinguish between adaptation from standing variation and de
novo mutation by looking for differences in what are called selective sweeps. Selective
sweeps occur when the alleles that are located near an adaptive allele under natural
selection also get selected for. The resulting reduction in genetic variation surrounding
the allele under direct selection is called a selective sweep. Selective sweeps are both
30 For one rare case, see Lachapelle et al. 2015.
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weaker and narrower if selection is for standing genetic variation rather than a de novo
mutation because a de novo mutation is selected for from the moment it appears, while
standing variation is neutral for a time before it becomes adaptive in a new environment.
Previously neutral alleles can reach intermediate frequency in a population without ever
being under direct selection. Once they are under direct selection, they sweep through a
population more quickly than a de novo mutation would, and this is what creates the
weaker and narrower (or, soft, as opposed to hard) sweep pattern (Barrett and Schluter
2008).
We have this prediction about selective sweeps because of formal modeling. And,
though looking for hard and soft sweeps is far from a perfect method for distinguishing
between de novo adaptations and adaptation from standing variation (Teshima et al.
2006), it is a helpful tool, and one that improves over time as modeling approaches
become more sophisticated (for an example of such increased sophistication, see Peter et
al. 2012).
The other technique that is improving biologists' ability to distinguish between
these two sources of adaptation and provide information about their relative frequency is
LNS. Depending on their choice of experimental population they can study either hard
sweeps (in asexual population) or soft sweeps (in sexual populations) in isolation (Burke
2012). There are also some model systems that allow for comparative analyses of both
types of sweeps, and these support, among other things, a much larger role for adaptation
from standing variation than from de novo variation (Burke 2014).
This selective sweep example is of dual relevance to the plasticity-first
hypothesis. First, it is a case where formal modeling and experimental evolution are
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doing precisely the kind of work that is of paramount importance for plasticity-first
research. It shows that the methodological strategy I am defending can be successful.
Second, the idea that selective sweeps or other genomic patterns may be diagnostic of
plasticity-first evolution is barely addressed in the literature (Gibson and Dworkin 2004).
As a result, no one knows if there is a difference between gene-first and phenotype-first
adaptation that parallels the one between standing variation and de novo mutation. But
this question should absolutely be explored. If there is a signature of phenotype-first
evolution that is analogous to that of standing genetic variation, discovering it would
transform the debate about the evolutionary significance of plasticity. Even if genomic
data alone is not sufficient to pick out phenotype-first adaptations, it may be able to do so
in combination with other kinds of data, such as information about a fixed allele's
selective environment.
6. Conclusion

The existing methodological strategy in plasticity-first research involves combining
comparative studies of different populations that demonstrate different pieces of the
plasticity-first hypothesis. Together, these studies are supposed to approximate the ideal
data set much like a mosaic might approximate a photograph. I have argued that this
strategy has not proven effective for generating discriminatory evidence. Worse, it is
insufficient as a stand-alone strategy for confirming or disconfirming the plasticity-first
hypothesis in the future. We should be concerned about this state of affairs because the
plasticity-first hypothesis stands at the center of one of the great questions facing
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evolutionary biology today: the extent to which the modern synthesis needs to be revised
or expanded to accommodate developmental and environmental influences on evolution.
I have argued that in addition to piecing together a mosaic of studies that address
the diverse components of plasticity-first evolution, researchers should go in for diversity
of further kind—methodological diversity that makes greater use of the full set of tools
available to evolutionary biologists. This means directing resources toward formal
modeling and experimental evolution studies. Once researchers use these tools to learn
more about the signature of plasticity-first evolution, they may find that the data they
have already collected has more discriminatory power than they thought, or they may
find that they need to look for very different data. But the priority has to be getting
researchers to a point where they can identify discriminatory evidence when they see it.
It is also possible that the plasticity-first hypothesis will not turn out to have a
distinct signature. There is no guarantee we can find evidence that bears on every
empirical question that interests us, though the historical sciences continue to surprise the
greater scientific community with their ingenuity (Currie 2015; Turner 2016). Regardless
of whether there is a signature to be found, however, experimental evolution and formal
models are where skeptics and advocates of plasticity-first evolution alike should
continue their dispute about the quality of the evidence for the hypothesis. These are the
research areas that will allow us to judge the depth of the underdetermination problem
facing the plasticity-first hypothesis and whether distinguishing between plasticity-first
and gene-first mechanisms of evolution is a matter of preference or genuine scientific
interest.
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Chapter 5: Fighting about Frequency

1. Introduction
Science is characterized by controversy. The term “scientific controversy” calls to mind a
clash of theories or hypotheses. One theory is right, the others are wrong, and debate is a
means of identifying which is which. But this intuitive picture admits of many
exceptions.
Consider Charles Darwin's theory of gradual speciation, which dominated the
field of evolutionary biology until 1972, when it was called into question by Niles
Eldredge and Stephen Jay Gould. Eldredge and Gould argued that the lifespan of a
species is not characterized by slow, continuous change, but by long periods of stability
interrupted by bursts of rapid evolution. Their new theory, which they called punctuated
equilibrium, threw evolutionary biology into chaos. Gould claimed that standard
Darwinism was “effectively dead” (Gould 1980, p. 120), while skeptics responded that
Gould and Eldredge had merely identified a “minor wrinkle on the surface of neoDarwinian theory” (Dawkins 1986, p. 251).
This dispute occupied biologists for decades (Ruse 2000), but strangely, both
sides agreed that speciation is sometimes gradual and sometimes punctuated. What was
at stake was not which theory was correct, but rather which was more common. In other
words, what they disputed was the relative frequency of these two patterns.
Such disputes about how often a process or pattern occurs are termed relative
frequency controversies. They are common throughout the sciences, even though they
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run contrary to the standard picture of what a scientific controversy is like. Perhaps
because of their non-paradigmatic structure, suspicion about the value of relative
frequency controversies pervades the philosophical discussion surrounding them and
affects the way scientists engage in them. This suspicion is a departure from an otherwise
established consensus: that demonstrating the value of scientific controversies is
important to defending the rationality of science (Machamer, Pera, and Baltas 2000).
After all, if a substantial number of scientific controversies are not worthwhile, there is
reason to question much of what scientists spend their time doing.
In response to this suspicion, I develop the first account of the value of relative
frequency controversies. I show that they contribute to the explanatory, epistemic, and
practical goals of scientific investigation. By clarifying the nature of this contribution, I
provide a better understanding of the dynamics of scientific discovery and dispel
common misunderstandings about this type of scientific disagreement.
2. Ubiquitous, overlooked, misunderstood

A brief survey of the literature on relative frequency controversies shows that they
are ubiquitous, overlooked, and misunderstood. The first philosophical work on relative
frequency controversies raised an important question about their scientific value but
failed to recognize how widespread they are. Subsequently, philosophers have used the
concept as a classificatory tool in analyses of particular controversies. Their
classifications are often wrong, however, a fact which suggests that the existing work on
relative frequency controversies is not clear or complete enough to allow for competent
application of the concept. Finally, many scientists who are themselves engaged in
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relative frequency controversies paradoxically treat relative frequency as an unworthy
basis for disagreement in order to undermine their opponents.
2.1 A definition
In a 1997 paper called “Why do biologists argue like they do?” Beatty develops a
definition of relative frequency controversies, ventures an account of why they exist, and
expresses a deep skepticism about their value. He points out that there are many scientific
questions for which no single theory provides a complete answer. Instead, there are
multiple theories, each of which is correct at least some of the time. When, scientists
argue about how often each of the different theories is correct, it is a relative frequency
controversy.31
Relative frequency controversy: a dispute about the proportion of
phenomena within a domain of inquiry that a scientific theory correctly
describes (adapted from Beatty 1997, p. S432)32
Gould and Eldredge, for example, maintained that punctuated equilibrium is a very
common pattern of speciation, while gradualists argued that it is rare.
Beatty goes on to note that relative frequency controversies occur all the time and
“at every level of investigation” (p. S434) in biology, echoing Lloyd and Gould's claim
that, “Almost all major questions, and great debates, in natural history, revolve around
the issue of relative frequency” (1993, p 598). Although Beatty's examples are all drawn
from biology, relative frequency controversies arise elsewhere as well. In Section 3 I will
show that issues of relative frequency are important in other sciences (and consider the
31 I follow McMmullin (1987) in understanding a scientific controversy as a publicly and persistently
maintained dispute concerned with a matter of belief and determinable by scientific means (p. 51).
32 Beatty uses the term “relative significance,” but I prefer “relative frequency” because arguments about
significance are a distinct type of disagreement that should not be conflated with arguments about
frequency. I return to this point in Section 3.
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importance of this fact), but for now I will explore Beatty's idea that the biological
context is crucial to understanding both why these controversies arise and why they
might be wastes of time. Let's start with classic examples of relative frequency
controversies.
What causes microevolution? Small evolutionary changes to a population might
be caused by natural selection. For example, a population of Galápagos finches might
develop longer beaks because those beaks make it easier to survive and reproduce (Grant
and Grant 2003). But small changes may also occur by chance. Even if longer beaks do
not provide an actual fitness advantage, random events may simply happen to help the
finches with longer beaks survive and reproduce. When changes to a population occur by
chance, rather than natural selection, biologists call it genetic drift. Which of of these two
forces, selection or drift, is the more common and powerful cause of evolutionary
change? Biologists have fought over this question since the middle of the twentieth
century, and the issue remains unsettled to this day (reviewed in Provine 1985; Skipper
2002).
How do new species form? If a herd of giraffes is separated into two groups by a
geographic barrier like a canyon, the groups will diverge from one another and, given
enough time, eventually become two separate species (Fennessy et al. 2016; Brown et al.
2007). This is called allopatric speciation. Species can also form without the presence of
a geographic barrier, such as when a slight difference in microhabitat preference or
reproductive timing prevents members of a population from breeding with each other.
This is called sympatric speciation. Between allopatric and sympatric speciation exist a
number of intermediate mechanisms, such as parapatric speciation (speciation between
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two adjacent groups that interbreed occasionally) and peripatric speciation (a small
population group becomes isolated from a larger one). Determining which mechanism
has operated in any particular case is very difficult, and biologists argue fiercely about
the relative frequency of different types of speciation (reviewed in Otte and Endler 1989;
Coyne and Orr 2004).33
How much of inheritance is extra-genetic? Biologists have long thought most of
the developmental information that produces parent-offspring resemblances comes from
genes. But inheritance of extra-genetic material—like environmental conditions, the
contents of germ cells, and behavioral cues—is an undeniable phenomenon. As biologists
have learned more about extra-genetic inheritance, some have challenged the primacy of
genetic inheritance and argued for the widespread existence and importance of alternative
inheritance mechanisms (e.g., Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Danchin et al 2011). This had
led to a heated debate: is genetic inheritance truly the dominant source of parentoffspring resemblances, or are these resemblances in large part due to extra-genetic
mechanisms (Laland et al. 2014)?
2.2 Beatty's challenge to the value of relative frequency controversies
Beatty believes that the prevalence of relative frequency controversies in biology
is tied to the contingent nature of evolution. It is true that biologists are able to discover
regularities in nature and make generalizations on the basis of regularities. But biological
generalizations are different from the “laws” of sciences like physics and chemistry.
While physical and chemical laws have few if any exceptions, biological generalizations
33 Another important dimension of the speciation controversy is how best to define the term “sympatric
speciation.” I do not discuss this dimension in this chapter, but it does interact in complex ways with the
relative frequency part of the debate.
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are riddled with them. Exceptions exist because biological evolution is a contingent
process. Evolution can produce different outcomes from the same starting point, and it
can devise multiple solutions to the same problem (Beatty 1995, pp. 57-8). As a result,
there is every reason to expect multiple ways of realizing any given biological
phenomenon, from adaptation to speciation to inheritance. In other words, there is every
reason to expect the presence of the conditions that make relative frequency controversies
possible.
This explanation for why relative frequency controversies are so common in
biology is connected to Beatty's concern that they are not worthwhile (Beatty 1997, p.
S437). He believes that particular distributions of relative frequency are contingent
because they are the outcomes of evolution. His worry about the value of relative
frequency controversies, then, is that the contingency of relative frequency distributions
means we do not understand the world any better once we have determined a relative
significance distribution than we did before we determined it. There's nothing
scientifically interesting about any particular relative frequency distribution, and time
spent arguing about or discovering one is better spent arguing about or discovering
something else.
Consider the case of speciation mechanisms. Beatty's view is that whether
speciation is allopatric 10% or 50% or 90% of the time, the distribution might have been
different, and likely would have been if the “tape of life” were to be rewound and played
again. Contrast this example with our knowledge of the relative frequency of the
outcomes of a coin flip or a dice roll. There is something telling about the 51%
probability that when you flip a coin it will come up the same way it started (Diaconis et
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al. 2007). In the coin toss case, the principles of physics determine the relative frequency
of heads to tails, but in the speciation case, there is no deeper principle that explains or
determines the particular relative frequency. The point is underscored by the fact that
biological relative significance distributions themselves can evolve and change, so having
resolved a relative significance dispute at one time does not mean that the answer was
always or will continue to be correct.
This worry is specific to biology and rests on Beatty's view of evolutionary
contingency, which is itself contentious.34 But there is a more general version of his
worry that avoids these problems. Beatty freely admits that scientists have practical
reasons for arguing about relative frequency, such as furthering their careers or
maximizing their chances of answering a time-sensitive question. What he wonders is
whether these arguments have value beyond the merely “socio-professional” or
“heuristic” (Beatty 1997, p. S441). He is looking for a reason to think that there is
something explanatory at stake in relative frequency disputes.
Science has multiple goals, but explanation is perhaps chief among them.
Roughly, to give a scientific explanation is to answer a “why question” about the world.
For example, the mechanism of natural selection answers the question, “Why do
organisms so often appear to be designed for their particular environments?” It's hard to
characterize explanation any more precisely than this, but setting debates about the nature
of explanation aside, most people do agree that there is a distinction between explanatory
and non-explanatory fact gathering and that some non-explanatory fact gathering is not of
scientific interest. Mere enumeration, for example, such as collecting as many samples of
34 It's also a relative frequency controversy in its own right! For a discussion, see Turner 2015.
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a particular species as possible simply for the sake of having them in a museum is more
like stamp collecting than science (Johnson 2007).
A general formulation of Beatty's worry, then, is that settling a relative frequency
controversy is merely enumerative. Scientists arguing about speciation mechanisms are
just tallying cases rather than pursuing interesting questions. In raising this worry, Beatty
also sets a challenge for anyone who thinks that relative frequency controversies can be
explanatory: show how answering a how often question about the world can help answer
a why question about the world.
2.3 Relative frequency after Beatty
Beatty's challenge has so far gone unanswered. His paper is often cited by others
working on specific biological controversies, but only for classificatory purposes. No one
has critically analyzed Beatty's assumption about the particularly biological nature of
these controversies, nor have they considered the merits of his concern about value.
Nevertheless, the classificatory work is still interesting. Philosophers have relied on
Beatty's original analysis to make recommendations about the best way to resolve
disputes (Skipper 2002; Craig 2015) and to make the important point that in biology,
controversies are rarely all-or-nothing affairs (Dietrich 2010, p. 176-7).
But there are also problems with the way philosophers deploy the concept of
relative frequency. The first problem is misdiagnoses of controversies. The second is a
conflation of frequency with significance. The third is the growing power of the idea that
relative frequency controversies are rarely (if ever) resolved. These are problems because
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they prevent us from accurately understanding the dynamics of relative frequency
controversies and their role in science.
I'll illustrate the first problem by considering a particular instance of
misdiagnosis.35 This case illustrates how difficult it can be to diagnose relative frequency
disputes and the need for further analysis of their structure.
The case comes from Anya Plutynski's (2005) discussion of the Fisher-Wright
controversy, so called because it involved two titans of mid-twentieth century biology,
Ronald Fisher and Sewall Wright. Fisher defended the primacy of natural selection while
Wright argued that drift, working in conjunction with other processes including selection,
was the most common way of generating adaptations (reviewed in Provine 1985). There
is something of a philosophical consensus that both this and later iterations of the debate
were indeed relative frequency controversies (Skipper 2002, 2009), but Plutynski, in an
attempt to defend the view that it was a relative frequency controversy, unwittingly
provides a compelling argument to the contrary.
Plutynski's insight is that a deeper disagreement animated what was, on the
surface, a debate about the frequency of the different factors that generate adaptations.
The deeper disagreement was about how to best understand what the problem of
adaptation actually is (p. 600). She argues that Fisher believed the most difficult thing to
explain about adaptations is what produces and maintains variation in a population. Once
variation exists, natural selection sorts through it and generates adaptations. The true

35 A second case of misdiagnosis is Craig's (2015) argument that the debate between evo-devo and neoDarwinian theory is a relative frequency controversy. They characterize these views as mutually
exclusive, which makes a relative frequency controversy impossible
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problem of adaptation is understanding the mechanisms that create and maintain variation
in the first place.
Wright, on the other hand, conceptualized populations as existing in threedimensional “fitness landscapes.” The landscapes have peaks, which represent high
fitness states of a population, and valleys, which represent low fitness states. Natural
selection can help a population move up a slope and toward a peak, but it cannot help a
population on the top of a small peak cross a fitness valley in order to get to a still higher
peak. Since natural selection does not have foresight, it cannot lead a population to a
worse fitness state for the sake of getting it to an even better one in the future. Wright
believed that fitness landscapes are rugged—full of many peaks and valleys. As a result,
he believed the problem of adaptation was less about understanding how a population
comes to have variation in the first place and more about understanding the evolutionary
forces that can help populations cross fitness valleys. Since natural selection alone cannot
do this, he was drawn to the idea that other forces such as drift are frequent and important
in generating adaptations.
If Plutynski's analysis is right, then the Fisher-Wright debate only appears to be
about relative frequency.36 In reality, the disagreement about the frequencies of selection
and drift obscures the true disagreement, which is a disagreement about the nature of the
phenomenon to be explained. Fisher thinks the explanatory question posed by adaptation
is, “Why don't populations run out of variation?” while Wright thinks it is, “How do

36 I do not claim that other iterations of the selection vs. drift debate are not relative frequency
controversies, just that the particular disagreement between Fisher and Wright didn't have this character.
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populations cross fitness valleys?” If this disagreement could be resolved, the fight about
relative frequency might disappear.
This misdiagnosis is interesting because it shows that participants can be mistaken
about whether they are involved in a relative frequency controversy. Such mistakes can
lead those engaged in a controversy to focus on a secondary issue (e.g. relative
frequency) rather than the issue that is actually fueling the dispute (e.g. the nature of the
explanatory problem). There needs to be a deeper understanding of the structure of
relative frequency controversies in order to prevent misdiagnoses and unnecessary
secondary debates.
A second problem in the relative frequency literature is conflating disputes about
frequency with disputes about significance. Consider this statement in Michael Dietrich's
(2010) analysis of a controversy about macroevolutionary processes (i.e., processes such
as species selection that occur above the species level):
Rather than deny that distinct macroevolutionary processes are possible and present in
nature, I claim that such processes are possible in the case of species selection but are
relatively rare and so are of minor evolutionary consequence when the entirety of the
domain of evolutionary biology is considered (p. 176).
Here, Dietrich is claiming that because this process is rare, it is also insignificant.
But this clearly does not follow. Scientists often defend the significance of processes that
they know or suspect are rare. Frequency is one way, but not the only way, to be
significant. For example, the inheritance of adaptive behaviors via culture is rare because
only a few species transmit information through cultural channels. Yet many scholars
believe that cultural inheritance is an important phenomenon because when it does occur,
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it can change the evolutionary trajectory of a species (Sterelny 2012). This example
shows that arguing about significance does not necessarily entail arguing about
frequency. The opposite is also true. It is certainly common to argue that if a process is
common, this means it is also important, but there is no necessary connection between the
two.
There is a bigger point here. Frequency and significance are not just conceptually
distinct; the structure of disagreements about relative frequency and relative significance
is also importantly different. Disagreements about frequency are tied more closely to
empirical facts than disputes about significance because participants agree on what
constitutes frequency. Tallying up cases may or may not be worthwhile, but it is at least
clear what tallying up cases means. The idea of a process being significant, on the other
hand, is much more controversial. In a disagreement about relative significance, much of
the action has to do with what participants mean when they use the term “significance.”
These disputes, though scientific, are also deeply philosophical. They involve extraempirical argumentation about the conditions that confer significance in the first place.
To conflate relative frequency and relative significance disputes, then, is to
conflate disputes in which participants have a common understanding of what it would
take settle the disagreement between them and disputes in which they do not. Both kinds
of disputes are worth having, but analyses of their structure and value will look very
different. Conflating them collapses an important epistemic distinction and risks
generating systematic misunderstanding.
The third problem in the relative frequency literature is the widespread idea that
these controversies are rarely ever resolved. Instead, they either fizzle out as participants
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lose interest (see, for example, Hey 1999, p. 35) or continue indefinitely, much like
philosophical arguments about free will or skepticism. This idea is exemplified by
Millstein's (2007) comment that, “it is unlikely that this new debate, were it to occur,
would cover any new ground, or be any more likely to be resolved, given the seemingly
unending nature of its predecessors” (p. 283).
It is true that there are few cases of relative frequency controversies coming to a
clear, determinate end in which all parties reach consensus.37 It is also true that many
controversies fizzle out, even though no one really thinks that the original question
animating the dispute has been answered. The punctuated equilibrium dispute fits this
description. Still other controversies seem to drag on for decades without any real
progress. The selection versus drift debate, for example, has existed in variation forms for
over 75 years.
The problem is not much that the perception of these controversies' lack of
resolution is inaccurate. Rather, the problem is a failure to grapple with the implications
of this phenomenon. This is a problem because the way in which scientific controversies
are resolved is traditionally taken to be the primary indicator of their rationality. If
relative frequency controversies are characterized by a lack of resolution, then not only
their value, but also their rationality, is called into question.
Even the most passionate defenders of the rationality of science admit that ego
and bias and ambition and a host of other sociological factors may ignite a scientific
controversy. These same controversies may be sustained for years, even decades, on

37 Though there are some cases! The example of nutrient limitation, which I discuss in Section 3, is one of
them.
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similarly arational or irrational grounds. These facts do not, however, threaten our picture
of science as rational as long as controversies are closed by reason and argument (Kitcher
2000, pp. 28-8). It is the way in which controversies end, rather than the ways in which
they begin or proceed, that characterizes science as a rational enterprise.
This puts relative frequency controversies in a precarious position. How should
we think about the rationality of relative frequency controversies if they are rarely
resolved? How can scientists, when they are aware that relative frequency controversies
are rarely resolved, engage in them in good faith? In Section 4, I will answer these
questions by showing that the phenomenon of relative frequency controversies requires
us to broaden the traditional conception of what it means to resolve a scientific dispute. It
is indeed true that the way in which a controversy ends is the most relevant fact in
assessing its rationality, but resolving a controversy looks different in the case of relative
frequency than it does in an argument about whether a theory is true or false.
For now, though, I will end this section by noting that the way in which scientists
manipulate the concept of relative frequency for rhetorical purposes compounds the
worry about their lack of resolution. Gould and Lewontin, for example, are clear about
the strategic uses of relative frequency in scientific disputes:
In natural history, all possible things happen sometimes; you generally do
not support your favoured phenomenon by declaring rivals impossible in
theory. Rather, you acknowledge the rival, but circumscribe its domain of
action so narrowly that it cannot have any importance in the affairs of
nature. Then, you often congratulate yourself for being such an
ecumenical chap (1979, p. 585).
The strategy is clear. If you are a scientist engaged in a relative frequency dispute,
paint your opponents as petty. Lament the other side's obsession with tallying cases; treat
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infrequency as tantamount to insignificance; suggest that arguments about frequency are
being used as a substitute for solid evidence.
It is not hard to find recent examples of scientists who appear to be following
Gould and Lewontin's template. Here are two brief examples. The first is from a paper
about sympatric speciation:
While having the term 'sympatric speciation' in the title of a manuscript
may improve its chances of publication in a high-profile journal, we
question whether an obsession with identifying true cases of sympatric
speciation is the best way to advance the science” (Fitzpatrick et al. 2008.
p. 6).
The second example comes from a paper about the role of developmental phenomena in
evolution:
We could stop and argue about whether 'enough' attention is being paid to
any of these [mechanisms]. Or we could roll up our sleeves, get to work,
and find out by laying the theoretical foundations and building a solid
casebook of empirical studies (Laland/Wray et al. 2014, p. x).
These examples may be strategic exploitations of relative frequency issues, or
they may represent genuine doubts and frustrations. In either case, the important point is
that it is not difficult to find scientists who are both engaged in relative frequency
controversies and willing to voice ambivalence about them. This fact makes the concern
about unresolved controversies even more acute. Perhaps scientists do not expect to make
progress toward settling questions of relative frequency. If so, the prevalence of these
controversies starts to look more and more like a waste of time.
3. Enriching the theoretical picture
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I have developed several concerns about relative frequency controversies. First,
they may not contribute to the scientific goal of explaining the natural world. Second,
they often drag on without resolution, or they fizzle out altogether, which suggests an
unhealthy mode of controversy. In addition to these two primary concerns, the
philosophical literature on these controversies is prone to misdiagnoses and a conflation
of frequency with significance. Finally, scientists themselves appear ambivalent about the
value of relative frequency disputes in which they themselves are involved.
In this section, I develop three theses about relative frequency controversies
which, together, provide tools for addressing these concerns. My goal here is to enrich
the existing theoretical picture of relative frequency controversies. Then, in Section 4, I
use this enriched picture to respond to the concerns I developed in Section 2. The three
theses I develop are:
(a) Fighting about frequency is a phenomenon that extends far beyond biology.
(b) Fighting about frequency is a stage, rather than a permanent state, of many
controversies.
(c) Fights about frequency are fueled by different kinds of disagreements.
3.1 Non-biological fights about frequency
Wherever there are scientific questions for which no single theory provides a
complete answer, there is also the potential for a relative frequency controversy. As we
have seen, evolutionary contingency is one source of this potential. But there are also
other sources, and as a result, it is possible for relative frequency controversies to exist in

106

areas of science that are not influenced by evolutionary contingency in the way that
biology is. Here are two examples, one from biogeochemistry and one from geology.
Which nutrient most often limits primary productivity? Plants, algae and some
bacteria are called primary producers because they produce their own food from sunlight
and inorganic material through a process called photosynthesis. The rest of us depend
directly or indirectly on primary producers for our food. About half of all primary
producers are ocean-dwelling phytoplankton, and these phytoplankton can only
photosynthesize when the seawater in which they live has sufficient quantities of nitrogen
and phosphorus. Between the 1960s and the early 2000s, marine biologists and
geochemists debated about which of these two nutrients is typically depleted first and
thus most often controls rates of marine primary productivity (Ryther and Dunstan 1971;
Smith 1984). The debate was settled when scientists agreed that nitrogen availability
usually controls primary productivity in the short term, but phosphorus is more important
in the long term (Tyrrell 1999; Moore et al. 2013). The emerging consensus on this issue
has raised further, more fine-grained questions about the relationship between primary
productivity and nutrient availability. For example, scientists are now investigating
hypotheses about the productivity-limiting role of other nutrients such as iron, and they
are also increasingly interested in cases where two nutrients are co-limiting (Behrenfeld
and Kolber 1999; Geider et al. 2001; Moore et al. 2013).
What are the causes of intra-plate volcanism? Most volcanoes form at the edges
of tectonic plates. Plate tectonic theory describes how these volcanoes are formed by
plates as they collide or pull apart. But there are still hundreds of volcanoes occur that in
the middle of tectonic plates, including those responsible for the Galápagos Islands, the
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Hawaiian Islands, and Yellowstone National Park. How do geologists explain the
existence of these intra-plate volcanoes? There are two main contenders, the plume
hypothesis and the plate hypothesis. According to the plume hypothesis, intra-plate
volcanoes are caused by plumes of molten rock welling up from deep within the mantle
of the Earth. The locations of these “mantle plumes” are fixed, and as the earth's crust
moves slowly over them, the plumes generate time-progressive chains of volcanoes such
as the Hawaiian islands. The competing hypothesis, the plate hypothesis, tries to account
for intra-plate volcanoes by appealing to “shallow” processes in the earth's crust and
upper mantle. Though some geologists are skeptical that mantle plumes exist at all, most
agree that both plumes and tectonic processes produce intra-plate volcanoes. Their
dispute, which they call “the great plume debate,” focuses on the likely causes of
particular volcanoes and the relative frequency of the mechanisms that produce them
(reviewed in Foulger 2010).
Whether relative frequency controversies turn out to have value, and whether the
ways in which they are and are not resolved is a problem for their rationality, these issues
are important beyond the confines of biology. Biology may have more than its fair share
of these controversies, but it is not the only science where they occur. Relative frequency
controversies arise in sciences that are more law-like and less plagued with exceptions to
every generalization than biology is. In fact, their presence in such sciences suggests that
evolutionary contingency is an insufficient explanation for why they exist. Considering
examples from multiple sciences is a plausible way of generating a more complete
understanding of why these controversies arise.
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Beatty explains relative frequency controversies by referencing a specific feature
of scientific questions: a question is likely to inspire a fight about frequency if scientists
need to appeal to multiple theories or mechanisms in order to answer the question. But of
course, not all such scientific questions inspire relative frequency controversies. For
example, compare the following two geological questions:
(i) What are the processes that form mountains?
(ii) What are the processes that form intra-plate volcanoes?
Answering both questions requires geologists to appeal to multiple mechanisms.
Mountains are formed by the uplifting of continental crust and the eruptions of volcanoes,
among other things. We've already seen that both mantle plumes and shallow plate
tectonic processes are likely explanations for the formation of intra-plate volcanoes. But
though there is a very active relative frequency controversy about (ii), we are unlikely
ever to witness a relative frequency controversy about (i). Why?
I propose that the answer has not only to do with the kind of scientific question
being asked, but the ease or difficulty of obtaining evidence that bears on the question. It
is fairly easy to determine whether a mountain was formed by volcanic processes or not.
Scientists know how to use facts about a mountain's location, mineral composition, etc. to
determine how it originated. If they wanted a rough estimate of the relative frequency of
different processes, they could get one. But for that same reason, it is less likely that
anyone will ever care to the know the relative frequency of different mountain formation
processes. There is no deeper mystery about how the world works, because the processes
themselves are fairly transparent to us.
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On the other hand, it is quite difficult to determine whether a volcano was formed
by a mantle plume or some other process. The features that make it difficult to determine
how a volcano formed are different than those that make it difficult to determine whether
a species formed through allopatry or sympatry. In the first case, the relevant evidence is
difficult to access because it is hidden deep underneath the surface of the earth. In the
second case, the relevant evidence is difficult to access because the actual process of
speciation occurred a long time ago, and the traces the process left behind have degraded
over the millennia. But despite these differences, both are cases in which obtaining
evidence about any particular instance of the phenomenon under investigation is likely to
be challenging.
I think there is an inverse relationship between how easy it is to obtain evidence
about whether a process has occurred in a particular case and how interesting we find
questions about the relative frequency of that process. If it's hard to find evidence of the
former, then we might use a relative frequency distribution, if we had it, to estimate how
likely it is that the process we're curious about occurred in the particular case we're
considering. But if it's already easy to find evidence about the process in the particular
case, and thereby easy to generate an answer to the corresponding relative frequency
question, then answering that question is less interesting because we are less likely to use
the answer about relative frequency to answer any other questions.
Combining this feature, the difficulty of obtaining evidence, with Beatty's point
about the nature of the scientific question provides us with a better understanding of the
conditions under which relative frequency controversies are likely to arise. Here I have
only discussed two different ways in which evidence may be difficult to obtain, but of
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course there are many more. Small sample sizes are one example, and non-additive
interactions between processes that is another.38
3.2 Stages of controversies
The second thesis I will develop is that relative frequency is not an intrinsic
feature of a controversy but rather a stage through which many controversies progress.
There was a time when biologists thought all speciation was allopatric (Mayr 1947).
When John Maynard Smith pioneered the idea of sympatric speciation (1966), people
argued over whether it was even possible. Eventually, after the theoretical possibility of
the idea was demonstrated to everyone's satisfaction, the fight shifted to whether it had
ever actually occurred in nature. Once careful empirical work produced plausible real life
examples (e.g. Feder et al, 1988; Savolainen et al. 2006), the controversy shifted again, to
the relative frequency of allopatric, sympatric, and other speciation mechanisms.
This is a common pattern. Very often, relative frequency becomes an issue only
after a theory's possibility and actuality are established. There are certainly exceptions to
this pattern. Gould, for example, claimed that punctuated equilibrium was the primary
speciation pattern before there were any convincing examples of it. Even in such cases,
however, the ensuing debate often focuses on developing actual examples before
transitioning into a fight about frequency. So, although this logical ordering of stages

38 So far, my discussion of relative frequency has oversimplified in an important respect. I have made it
seem as though the different processes or mechanisms at issue in a relative frequency dispute operate
independently of one another. But of course the situation is often more complicated. Both selection and
drift can, together, be responsible for an adapted trait. The reality of interactions between the
mechanisms at issue in a relative frequency dispute does make the actual process of solving them more
difficult, but it does not affect the analysis that I give in this chapter.
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doesn't always map on to the exact chronology of a controversy, it still captures a useful
generalization.
The usefulness of this generalization lies in the fact that it places fights about
frequency into conversation with other fights that scientists have. It helps us see that
these fights are not wholly independent forms of scientific controversy. Instead, they are
developmentally linked to more traditional and paradigmatic forms. The lifetime of a
controversy may include arguments about possibility, actuality, frequency, or
significance. It may also include arguments about the appropriate methodologies or
instruments for studying a process, or arguments about how to best characterize the
questions at the center of scientific investigation. What is the significance of this fact?
Sometimes, this context helps to explain the bitterness of a particular controversy.
Part of why the extra-genetic inheritance controversy is so heated, for example, is that in
the middle of the twentieth century, the idea that all inheritance is genetic was understood
to be central to the definitive statement of evolutionary theory known as the Modern
Synthesis. Since then, biologists' interpretations of the core commitments of the Modern
Synthesis have softened and evolved, but the debate about inheritance is still reckoning
with evolutionary biology's history of absolutism about genetic inheritance (Pigliucci and
Müller 2010).39
In addition to this helpful sociological context, the stage interpretation of relative
frequency controversies also suggests something deeper about controversy resolution. To
say that the controversy over the possibility of sympatric speciation has been resolved,
while the controversy over it relative frequency controversy has not, and to use that fact
39 See Jiggins (2006) for a similar analysis of the development of the sympatric speciation controversy.
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to question the value of the relative frequency controversy, downplays the important
connections between these two fights. Given the nature of this connection, it may be too
simple to say that one controversy is resolved and the other is not. Instead, the way we
think about the resolution of the relative frequency controversy also effects our ability to
say that the controversy over possibility was successfully resolved.
3.3 Different bases for relative frequency controversies
Not only are relative frequency controversies closely related to other kinds of
controversy in virtue of the stage interpretation I have just presented, the idea of stages is
also internal to relative frequency controversies. The third thesis I will defend is the idea
that fights about frequency are fueled by different kinds of disagreements. Further, a
relative frequency controversy can evolve from having one base to having a different
base.
We have already seen, in the case of Plutynski's analysis of the Fisher-Wright
debate, that what looks like a fight about relative frequency may actually be a fight about
something else, such as the nature of the phenomenon to be explained. We have also seen
that it is easy to confuse debates about significance with debates about frequency.
Whether a given controversy is a relative frequency controversy, then, is not always
obvious. In order to determine whether it is or not, one must consider its internal structure
and identify the issue that is keeping the controversy alive.
I'll distinguish two different kinds of disagreement that can fuel a relative
frequency dispute. The first is disagreement about the conditions under which the
mechanisms or processes that are the subjects of a relative frequency controversy operate.
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The second is disagreement due to the difficulty of finding evidence about what
conditions actually hold or have held in the world. These two kinds of disagreement are
conceptually distinct, but they are not mutually exclusive. Both may be in play in a single
controversy at one time, or a controversy may shift from being animated by one of these
kinds of disagreement to being animated by the other kind.
The first kind of disagreement is disagreement about the conditions under which
the processes that are the subjects of a relative frequency controversy operate. Let's return
to the sympatric speciation controversy for an example. An unanswered question about
sympatric speciation is, What kinds of environments and states of populations make
sympatric speciation more or less likely to occur (for a review of the work on this
question, see Bird et al. 2012)? In other words, sympatric speciation will occur in some
kinds of populations and some kinds of environments, but which ones? Further questions
include: How fragile or robust of a process is it? What are the features of the world that
are most important for predicting sympatric speciation? It is easy to see how such basic
disagreement and uncertainty about when and why and how a process occurs can fuel a
relative frequency controversy. It may also be tempting to suppose that once such
questions are settled—once scientists do understand the conditions under which different
processes occur—that assessing relative frequency and resolving the controversy will be
easy.
Of course, the situation is not so simple. The other kind of disagreement that can
fuel a relative frequency controversy can persist even when the first type is resolved.
Even when scientists do understand which states of the world make which processes
more likely, it can be very difficult to find out what the world is like now, or what it has
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been like in the past. As discussed in Section 3.1, the difficulty of obtaining evidence is
an important feature of many relative frequency controversies, including the controversy
over speciation mechanisms and the Great Plume Debate.
To remain engaged in a controversy when all that sustains it is the unavailability
of evidence seems irrational. Isn't a better course of action to suspend the disagreement
until more evidence can be found? This question brings us back to the most important
issue in this chapter: the value of relative frequency controversies. Do these controversies
have value? If so, what sort? In the next section, I use the enriched picture of these
controversies that I have just developed to answer these questions.
4. The value of relative frequency controversies

My view is that relative frequency controversies have three types of value:
explanatory, epistemic, and pragmatic. Not every controversy has every type of value.
Rather, the type of value is relative to the nature of the disagreement sustaining the
controversy. Further, understanding the different types of value that these controversies
have suggests a different conception of what it means to resolve a relative frequency
controversy. On this conception, the fizzling out of a relative frequency controversy is a
type of resolution.
4.1 Explanatory value
A scientific controversy has explanatory value if answering the question at the
heart of the controversy helps scientists provide a better explanation of some natural
phenomenon. Beatty has suggested that the relative frequency of a biological process
represents nothing more than a “highly contingent fact of evolutionary history on earth up

115

to the present day” (1997, p.S440). One natural response to this is to say that our basic
understanding of the kind of world we live in is dramatically affected by whether 90% of
all inheritance is genetic, or 10% of all inheritance is genetic. Even if it is true that the
relative frequency of inheritance mechanisms is contingent, it seems like an important
fact about the world and ourselves if genes are the primary reason we resemble our
parents, or only a marginal reason. This response is unsatisfactory, however, because it
only applies to rough, rather than precise, characterizations of relative frequency, and it
doesn't explain why determining a 90/10 distribution seems interesting, while fighting
over whether a distribution is 55/45 or 45/55 doesn't.
There is a better way to link relative frequency and explanatory value. To explain
it, I will rely on a recent paper by Angela Potochnik (2015). Potochnik begins by raising
a point that many philosophers of science who work on scientific explanation have
noticed. Often, the best way to explain an event is to reference the causal pattern that is
responsible for the event. In fact, referencing a causal pattern is in many cases considered
a better explanatory strategy than describing the precise causal sequence that led to the
event.
Potochnik illustrates the point with an example. Say I want to explain why the cup
of coffee on my desk is 70 degrees Fahrenheit. One way to do this is provide an
equilibrium explanation, which references a causal pattern: “Why is the cup of coffee on
my desk 70 degrees Fahrenheit? —because that is the ambient temperature of my office,
and the coffee has been sitting there for hours” (p. 1164). On the other hand:
An alternative explanation might depict features of the actual causal
process by, e.g., specifying that the eight ounce coffee was 170 F when
placed in the 70 room four hours ago; how the processes of evaporation,
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conduction, convection and radiation combined for a certain rate of heat
transfer; and how that rate and the relative masses and heat capacities of
the substances involved resulted in the beverage cooling to 70 well within
four hours (p. 1168).
It is common to regard the former explanation as better than the latter one.
Potochnik wants to understand why. She suggests that there are two features of the
equilibrium explanation that make it superior to the causal sequence explanation:
The answer lies, I think, in the ability of such explanations to depict causal
patterns. Depictions of causal patterns have two features that together
constitute their power to explain: (1) they feature one or more of the
properties of a system upon which the phenomenon to be explained
depends, and (2) they communicate information about the scope of that
dependence...Explanations that reference a broad causal
regularity...indicate the full range of circumstances in which a causal
dependence obtains. Causal pattern explanations thus not only depict
causal dependencies, they also delimit the scope of the dependence (p.
1169).
This second feature, communicating about the scope of a causal dependence, is what
causal sequence explanations often lack, and this is why equilibrium explanations are
often better. Communicating the scope of a causal pattern shows how a particular event
fits into the larger causal structure of the world.
For my purposes, the important point is that understanding the scope of some
causal pattern is highly relevant to providing high quality scientific explanations. The
reason this is important is that determining the scope of different causal patterns, such as
the causal patterns of sympatric and allopatric speciation, is precisely what scientists are
trying to do when they engage in some relative frequency controversies. In particular, the
controversies that are fueled by disagreement or uncertainty about the conditions under
which different processes occur are controversies in which scientists are struggling to
determine the scope of causal patterns. Resolving this disagreement and uncertainty
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amounts to providing information about relative frequency (though not necessarily
providing a complete relative frequency distribution), and it helps scientists provide a
better explanation of whatever natural phenomena are covered by the causal patterns
under investigation.
This is my response to Beatty's challenge, which, in its general form asks, how
can answering a how often question about the world help to answer a why question about
the world? When relative frequency controversies are fueled by the struggle to determine
the scope of causal patterns, they have explanatory value. This kind of value does not
apply to all relative frequency controversies, however, nor does it exhaust the kinds of
value that relative frequency controversies have.
4.2 Epistemic value
Explanatory value is a subset of a broader type of value called epistemic value. I
understand a scientific controversy to have epistemic value if resolving the controversy
helps to achieve one of the epistemic goals of science, which include explanation, but
also prediction, theoretical productivity, and self-correction. At the end of Section 3, I
asked whether scientists should suspend judgment when they find themselves engaged in
relative frequency controversies that are fueled by the difficulties of obtaining evidence.
The answer to this question is, of course, yes. If lack of evidence is the problem, then
scientists are facing an underdetermination problem, one in which the available evidence
does not tell them which of a set of viable hypotheses is correct. The rational response to
underdetermination is suspension of judgment.
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This does not, however, mean that scientists should not try to solve the
underdetermination problem. Continuing to fight over a question that cannot be answered
at present is bad practice, but developing ways of finding the answer is the bread and
butter of science. An interesting feature of underdetermination problems is that it can take
a long time to realize when you have one on your hands. One of the epistemic values of
relative frequency controversies is that they often make the existence of an
underdetermination problem known to the scientific community as a whole. And, it is
only once the underdetermination problem is widely recognized that scientists are in a
position to solve it.
Recall that controversies about how frequent a process such as sympatric
speciation or extra-genetic inheritance is often emerge from controversies about whether
that process ever occurs at all. An artifact of this history is that there is often a body of
data that most scientists assume supports the occurrence of a widely accepted process,
such as genetic inheritance or allopatric speciation, rather than the occurrence of the
process that has more recently been the subject of a controversy. Often, what is
happening in relative frequency controversies that are fueled by disagreements about
evidence more than disagreements about the scope of causal patterns is that some
scientists are trying to show that much of the data that had previously been assumed to
support the accepted process (e.g. genetic inheritance) is actually also compatible with
the more controversial process (e.g. a form of extra-genetic inheritance). As a result, they
argue that the field needs to reconsider the evidence and even look for new types of data
that do better at discriminating between the two kinds of process. When this happens,
scientists are drawing attention to a type of underdetermination problem known as
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contrast failure (Forber 2008). Using a relative frequency controversy to draw attention to
underdetermination in this way is epistemically valuable.
4.3 Practical value
A controversy has practical value if resolving it helps to achieve a practical goal.
It is clear that relative frequency controversies have this kind of value. Engaging in these
controversies may help a scientist's career. More substantively, there are cases when
successfully applying the results of science to a practical question requires scientists to
determine a relative frequency distribution. For example, an important goal of
biodiversity conservation efforts is preventing the spread of invasive species.
Conservation programs have limited resources, so they must decide how to best allocate
them. Determining what parts of the world are more likely to be a source of invasive
species helps conservation programs focus their invasion prevention efforts in the places
where they will be most effective. Biologists predict that inter-continental invasions are
far more common than intra-continental invasions (Mueller and Hellmann 2008), and
knowledge of this prediction allows conservationists to invest more time and money
inspecting vehicles that may transport species from one continent to another.
4.4 Resolving relative frequency controversies
The three-fold value of relative frequency controversies helps to answer our
question about their apparent lack of resolution. The question raised by the fizzling out of
relative frequency controversies is, how can they be rational if they are simply abandoned
when scientists lose interest, rather than closed by reason an argument? The answer to
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this question is that the abandonment of this kind of controversy is actually a sign of
scientific good sense, and its own kind of resolution.
Suppose scientists engaged in a relative frequency controversy are able to
characterize the scope of the causal patterns at issue in the controversy. This may not
generate a precise relative frequency distribution, but it provides some information about
relative frequency, and it improves the explanations that scientists can give of events that
are produced by the relevant causal patterns. Once this explanatory goal has been
achieved, why not give up on the controversy?
One answer, developed in Section 4.2, is that there may be an unappreciated
underdetermination problem that will be brought to light through continued controversy.
Once this epistemic value has been realized, the relative frequency issue may not be
settled, but there is no longer reason to fight about it. Instead, if scientists have practical
reasons to desire still more information about relative frequency, they can continue to
work on the problem, but the epistemic basis for controversy no longer exists.
At this point, the relative frequency issue may be abandoned altogether, or it may
continue to fuel research projects because there is practical value in generating more
information about relative frequency. In either case, though, the controversy will appear
to have been abandoned. It would be a mistake to confuse this abandonment with
irresolution, however. The thing that was truly at issue in the controversy, be it
explanatory, epistemic, or practical, has been resolved. It turns out, though, that resolving
a relative frequency controversy does not always mean producing an precise assessment
of the relative frequency of some process(es). What was truly at issue in the controversy
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was never exact relative frequency, but rather determining enough information about
relative frequency to answer some set of explanatory, epistemic, or practical questions.
The fizzling out of a controversy only looks like irresolution if one assumes that
the goal of those involved was to learn about the exact relative frequency of some
processes. But the very fact that scientists give up on these controversies without learning
this suggests that they were after something else all along. This does not mean that these
controversies are only pseudo-relative frequency controversies. Relative frequency in
some form or another—but not in the form of producing a precise relative frequency
distribution— is indeed the motivating issue.
5. Conclusion

Relative frequency controversies are misunderstood, but they are pervasive and
important elements of scientific practice. I have demonstrated that these controversies are
valuable to science, and my analysis of their value shows that, contrary to the way they
are commonly depicted, these controversies do reach resolution. These points are
important for those seeking to understand the dynamics of scientific disagreement and
discovery. By providing a guide to the kinds of disagreements that animate and sustain
fights about frequency, my analysis may also be of use to scientists engaged in these
disputes.
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